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*Geopolitics, human rights*

*Геополитика, права человека*

**Zemanek Ladislav**

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**The Rise of Eurasia: Shaping the New Eurasian Paradigm**

**Abstract.** The study presents a brief comparative view on the main Eurasian integration projects – Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Eurasian Economic Union, Greater Eurasia and the Belt and Road Initiative, focusing on their normativity, principles and goals. On the basis of such a comparison, a new paradigm of the international order called the New Eurasian Paradigm (NEP) is formulated. The article introduces a specific Eurasian attitude towards cooperation and integration and shows that there are no fundamental ideological contradictions among the Eurasian integration projects chosen but, at the same time, their successful development requires political will, close cooperation, mutual recognition and understanding and also a change of thinking, an identity reinterpretation and acceptance of Eurasia-orientated perspective and partnership.

**Key words:** Eurasia, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Eurasian Economic Union, Greater Eurasia, Belt and Road Initiative, China, Russia, integration, New Eurasian Paradigm.

**Земанек Ладислав**

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**Подъем Евразии: формирование Новой евразийской парадигмы**

**Аннотация.** Статья сравнивает главные евразийские интеграционные проекты – Шанхайскую организацию сотрудничества, Евразийский экономический союз, Большую Евразию и Инициативу Пояса и пути, сосредотачиваясь на их нормативную сторону, принципы и цели. Основываясь на их сравнении, формулируется новая парадигма международного порядка – т.н. Новая евразийская парадигма (НЕП). В

статье анализируется специфический евразийский подход к межгосударственному сотрудничеству и интеграции и, впоследствии, показывается, что не существует никаких основных несогласий среди рассматриваемых интеграционных проектов. Однако, их удачное развитие требует политической воли, узкого сотрудничества, взаимного уважения и понимания, так же как и изменения мышления, реинтерпретации идентичности и принятия евразийской перспективы и партнерства.

**Ключевые слова:** Евразия, Шанхайская организация сотрудничества, Евразийский экономический союз, Большая Евразия, Инициатива Пояса и пути, Китай, Россия, интеграция, Новая евразийская парадигма.

***Zemanek Ladislav***  
*Doctor of Philosophy,*  
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## **The Rise of Eurasia: Shaping the New Eurasian Paradigm\***

The rise of the non-Western Eurasia is a part of transformations of the international order. The turning point in the integration dynamics was provoked by the global economic crisis in 2008 which weakened the existing economic and political system, questioned the globalisation model based on the „Washington consensus“ neoliberal principles and forced the two powers – China and Russia – to a preparation of new scenarios. It resulted in the projects of the Eurasian Economic Union and Greater Eurasia on the one hand and the Belt and Road Initiative on the other. Their common proclaimed goal is to integrate the Eurasian macro-region and make it a centre of a redefined international order, new globalisation and global civilisation<sup>1</sup>. At the same time, cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has been deepening. In 2015, this Organisation became a main coordination platform for the Eurasian integration on the ground of an agreement between the Chinese and Russian president.

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### **Подъём Евразии: формирование Новой евразийской парадигмы**

1 Lukyanov F., Building Eurasia and defining Russia. In: Russia's "Pivot" to Eurasia. London: ECRF. 2014. 18 p. // URL: [http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR103\\_RUSSIA\\_COLLECTION\\_290514\\_AW.pdf](http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR103_RUSSIA_COLLECTION_290514_AW.pdf). Wang Yiwei, The Belt and Road Initiative. What Will China Offer the World in Its Rise. Beijing: New World Press. 2016. 13 p.

## **Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)**

One of the primary aims of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has been to respond effectively to those aspects of the existing global system which are perceived as negative or undesirable by means of policy coordination of the participating countries<sup>2</sup>. The main objectives of the SCO include strengthening of friendship and mutual trust, guaranteeing peace, security and stability in the region, promoting a democratic and fair political and economic international order, sustainable development, defending human rights as well as cultural diversity or cooperation on integrating into the global economic system. The SCO declares the principles of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference and equality<sup>3</sup>. So it criticises implicitly interventionism, unilateralism and neo-Liberalism coinciding with the peaceful coexistence principles.

It follows, the SCO promotes a reformist, not revisionist agenda that applies to China and Russia as key actors similarly; they strive for a change of certain aspects of the international system, not a removal of the system as a whole and introduction of completely new rules of the game. They urge a politics of gradual changes with regard to interests of particular world regions.

## **Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)**

The EAEU was established in January 2015 as a last from the attempts at integration of the post-Soviet area so far. Unlike the previous phases this time it should be not only custom union but full-fledged economic union when a political superstructure is not excluded. The founding agreement stresses the principles of equality, sovereignty, territorial integrity, market economy and respect to plurality of political systems of member states. Following the EU, the EAEU aim is to create condi-

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2 Lukin A., Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Looking for a New Role. Valdai Papers. Moscow: Valdai 2015. 3 p. // URL: <http://valdaiclub.com/files/11400/>.

3 Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2001 [online]. Eng.sectscsco.org. // URL: <http://eng.sectscsco.org/load/203013/>.

tions for free flow of capital, goods, services and labour force<sup>4</sup>.

The Eurasian integration project was a flag-ship of the third term of office of the Russian president Vladimir Putin. Its original goal was to strengthen the position of the region and lay solid foundation for integrating into the global structures. Initially, Putin did not consider the EAEU to be an alternative or rival project in relation to the EU but as a part of the so-called Greater Europe based on the principles of freedom, democracy and market economy<sup>5</sup>. However, in Western political and scholarly discourses is often perceived as a Kremlin tool for reestablishing of the Russian hegemony over the post-Soviet area, as a tool for resisting democratisation and other countries' independence<sup>6</sup>. Nevertheless, the one-sidedness of such an opinion becomes obvious if put the EAEU project into broader context of contemporary Russian politics.

### **Greater Europe and Greater Eurasia**

Over the two decades, a concept of the Greater Europe dominated the official political discourse, following the Gorbachevian idea of the „common European house“ in a sense<sup>7</sup>. The vision of a united economic and cultural space was promoted by the president Putin even in 2012 when he stressed that Russia was „an inseparable, organic part of the European civilisation“<sup>8</sup>. However, the active role of some Western countries in the so-called Arab spring, „colour revolutions“ and ultimately in the Ukrainian revolution brought about a turn. It led to a redefinition of Russian relations towards Europe and

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4 Договор о Евразийском экономическом союзе, 2014 [online]. Docseaeunion.org. // URL: [https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/0003610/itia\\_05062014](https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/0003610/itia_05062014).

5 Путин В.В. Новый интеграционный проект для Евразии – будущее, которое рождается сегодня [online]. Iz.ru. 3.10.2011. // URL: <https://iz.ru/news/502761>.

6 Kirkham K., The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union: How successful is the Russian regional hegemony? *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 2016. № 7 (2). P. 112-114. // URL: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S187936651630001X>.

7 Menkiszak M. Greater Europe. Putin's vision of European (dis)integration. Warsaw: OSW. 2013. 8 p. // URL: [http://aei.pitt.edu/58017/1/greater\\_europe\\_net-46.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/58017/1/greater_europe_net-46.pdf).

8 Путин В.В. Россия и меняющийся мир [online]. RG.ru. 27.2.2012. // URL: <http://rg.ru/2012/02/27/putin-politika.html>.

to deeping of tendencies already existing in the Russian political mainstream since the times of the prime minister Yevgeny Primakov who was emphasizing multipolarity, more realistic and less enthusiastic attitude towards the West. These tendencies prevailed over the pro-Western orientation in 2014 definitively. For the first time over the last three hundred years, Europe lost its privileged position and became just one among many other partners for Russia<sup>9</sup>.

The concept of the Greater Europe was replaced with the Greater Eurasia or Greater Eurasian Partnership. The plan of the Greater Eurasian Partnership was publicaly presented by the president Putin on the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2016<sup>10</sup>. The new concept is based on the principles of inclusivity, win-win cooperation, respect to sovereignty and territorial integrity which entirely coincides with the principles of the SCO, EAEU and BRI. According to Putin, the existing models of development have become obsolete and non-functional and are leading to fragmentation and protectionism. The Greater Eurasia is to offer a new model of cooperation, integration and globalisation. Its backbone should be formed by the SCO, BRI, EAEU and – in the optimal case – by the APEC and EU as well<sup>11</sup>. So Moscow has not renounced the idea of common economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok but made it significantly wider. The Russian leadership started to emphasise plurality of cultures and intercultural dialogue which clearly shows departure from one-sided Western orientation before 2012. Not by coincidence, Putin presents the Greater Eurasia not as a geopolitical or economic but civilisational project<sup>12</sup>.

Although the Greater Eurasia as such is not directed against

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9 Bordachev T., *Russia and China in Central Asia: The great win-win game*. Valdai papers, 50. Moscow: Valdai 2016. 26 p. // URL: <http://valdaiclub.com/files/11127/>.

10 Пленарное заседание Петербургского международного экономического форума [online]. Kremlin.ru. 17.6.2016. // URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178>.

11 Международный форум «Один пояс, один путь» [online]. Kremlin.ru. 14.4.2017. // URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54491>.

12 Ibidem.

the EU presupposing its participation, the content of the concept collides with current Western political practices. The respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-interference from the part of the West are frequently conditioned by adherence to human rights and democratic values. But the problem lies in necessary plurality of interpretations (especially in the case of human rights and democracy) and in unceasing enforcement of Western interpretations and Western perspectives which produces negative reminiscence of colonialism.

### **Belt & Road Initiative (BRI)**

Regarding the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, it is designed for new conditions of multipolarising world. It aims to connect individual macro-regions, helps to integrate them into the global economy and gives new impetus to global development dynamics. It follows the principles of peaceful co-existence striving for the utmost inclusivity and win-win cooperation<sup>13</sup>. The BRI holds the opening-up policy and offers a new model of international relations, integration and globalisation. The ambition of the Chinese leadership is to create „a community of shared destiny“. If Putin calls the Greater Eurasia a new civilisational project, the BRI defines a similar objective as it intends to build a new and sustainable civilisation in the area of economy, society, culture, politics as well as ecology<sup>14</sup>. The BRI presents a vision of a more democratic and inclusive global order based on the principles of balance, inclusivity and harmony<sup>15</sup>.

### **Eurasian approach towards integration**

If we look at Western and Eurasian (Chinese or Russian) attitude towards integration, we can see a substantial difference. Whereas the EU conditions integration by adopting its own, Western norms and complex reforms, the SCO, EAEU or

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13 Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road [online]. En.ndrc.gov.cn. 28.3.2015. // URL: [http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/new-release/201503/t20150330\\_669367.html](http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/new-release/201503/t20150330_669367.html).

14 Wang Yiwei, *The Belt and Road Initiative*, P. 3-8.

15 Wang Yiwei, *The Belt and Road Initiative*, P. 162-165.



BRI do not require such steps. With respect to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference there are no requirements regarding reforms. One can formulate a hypothesis that conditions of such a kind are not necessary at all because in consequence of intensive interactions and deepening integration a wide array of positive changes (democratisation, strengthening of law etc.) will be probably going on in political, economic and social structure of individual states. If this is true, it is also probable that under such circumstances transformations will not lead to instability, upheavals and severe conflicts as happens in case of „export of democracy“. That is why China and Russia prefer stability of existing regimes together with evolutionary, gradual changes<sup>16</sup>. This attitude clearly manifests itself in system setting of the Eurasian integration processes. The absence of political and ideological dictate is most likely a consequence of negative experience with Western „universalism“ and at the same time a manifestation of recognition of the right for its own development. A danger of radical particularism arises which is intensified by a tendency towards absolute state sovereignty but such a danger is balanced with the emphasis on dialogue and multilateralism.

### **Conclusion: New Eurasian Paradigm**

The brief comparison of the concepts and principles of the Eurasian integration projects shows that these projects are compatible and even overlapping each other at the normative, ideological level (which does not deny the fact they have various legal and economic status and setting). The SCO, EAEU, BRI as well as Greater Eurasia represent a new model of cooperation and a specific attitude towards international relations and global order corresponding to new conditions of a multipolar world which is characterised by concurrent processes of globalisation and regionalisation<sup>17</sup>. The Eurasian projects

<sup>16</sup> Bordachev T. Russia and China in Central Asia, P. 6-7.

<sup>17</sup> Söderbaum F., Introduction: Theories of New Regionalism. In: F. Söderbaum, T.M. Shaw (Eds.), Theories of New Regionalism. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 2003. 5 p.

embody a perspective of the emancipating and strengthening non-Western world, a new paradigm of global order which I call „the New Eurasian Paradigm“ (NEP).

The NEP is based on the principles of equality, inclusivity, openness, sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, sustainable development and market economy. The principles of human rights or democracy are also included but in a specific, illiberal interpretation corresponding with practice of Chinese and Russian political models which are characterised by the emphasis on community and its interests as well as common, shared values.

Let's emphasize that the integration of Eurasia is not to be building a fortress but an open, inclusive, complex and multilayered process whose key actors – China and Russia – have endeavoured to interconnect the broad continental area and create a space of mutual cooperation<sup>18</sup>. According to president Putin, the Greater Eurasia should include the EU and APEC, Russian strategic documents mention the perspective of connecting SCO, EAEU and ASEAN and, at the same time, voices in favour of the EU joining the SCO have been growing stronger in China<sup>19</sup>. To conclude, if the integration of Eurasia is deepening, if security threats and political tensions are eliminated, Eurasia could become a driving force of global growth in the future.

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<sup>18</sup> Li Xin, Chinese Perspective on the Creation of a Eurasian Economic Space. Valdai Discussion Club Report. Moscow: Valdai. 2016. 14 p. // URL: <http://valdaiclub.com/files/12585/>.

<sup>19</sup> Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации [online]. Kremlin. ru. 1.12.2016. // URL: [http://www.mid.ru/foreign\\_policy/news/-/asset\\_publisher/cKNonKjE02Bw/content/id/2542248](http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonKjE02Bw/content/id/2542248). Wang Yiwei, The Belt and Road Initiative. 68 p.

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**Foreign policy of sovereign Uzbekistan: basic principles and changes after 2016th**

**Abstract.** The foreign policy shift realized by Shavkat Mirziyoyev caused unprecedented attention around Uzbekistan among the international community. In his two years of presidency Mirziyoyev has been able to transform the relations with all the neighbors, make input in settlement of Afghanistan problem, and enhance cooperation with global powers: Russia, China, and the US. Actual topic of Uzbekistan's foreign policy has been around the new foreign policy concept. The current and the first ever concept paper in the sphere of foreign policy was adopted on 1 August, 2012 – and delivered two major points: the military neutrality and Central Asia as a priority region of Uzbekistan's foreign policy.

**Key words:** Uzbekistan, foreign policy, international community, strategy, military neutrality, Central Asia.

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**Внешняя политика суверенного Узбекистана: основные принципы и изменения после 2016-го года**

**Аннотация.** Изменения во внешней политике, осуществленные Шавкатом Мирзиёевым, вызвали беспрецедентное внимание международного сообщества к Узбекистану. За два года своего президентства Мирзиёев смог трансформировать отношения со всеми соседями, внести свой вклад в урегулирование проблемы Афганистана и расширить сотрудничество с мировыми державами: Россией, Китаем и США. Актуальной темой внешней политики Узбекистана стала новая концепция внешней политики. Нынешний и первый в истории концептуальный документ в области внешней политики был принят 1 августа 2012 года - и в нем были отмечены два основных момента: военный нейтралитет и Центральная Азия как приоритетный регион внешней политики Узбекистана.

**Ключевые слова:** Узбекистан, внешняя политика, международное сообщество, стратегия, военный нейтралитет, Центральная Азия.

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**Foreign policy of sovereign Uzbekistan:  
basic principles and changes after 2016<sup>th\*</sup>**

«Uzbekistan's foreign policy under Mirziyoyev follows the course set by Karimov in 2012 and will continue to do so at least for the next 5 years. There are many changes that are indeed significant, but they mostly refer to how Uzbekistan goes about achieving its foreign policy objectives rather than what those objectives are», – independent researcher Nurbek Bekmurzaev notes in his article written specifically for the analytical platform [cabar.asia](http://cabar.asia)<sup>1</sup>.

After analyzing the evolution of Uzbekistan's and other central Asian countries' foreign policy after the collapse of the USSR I would like to deepen why Uzbekistan, having a certain range of opportunities to choose the orientation to several different world centers of power, ultimately chose a strategy of equidistance, non-alignment and orientation to bilateral relations with states. In my opinion, a special case (the basis for a case study) of Uzbekistan is to preserve the above-mentioned basic principles for the formation of a foreign policy strategy and course regardless of the personality of the head of state - which does not allow them to be seen only as a result of the personal choice of the country's president, but requires to be

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**Внешняя политика суверенного Узбекистана: основные принципы и изменения после 2016-го года**

1 <https://cabar.asia/en/what-to-expect-from-uzbekistan-s-new-concept-of-foreign-policy/>

considered as the result of the influence of a combination of factors (geopolitical, economic, cultural, historical, domestic political, etc.). Analyzing the totality of these factors, I will try to answer the question of why Uzbekistan, in the presence of a whole range of alternatives from 1992 to 2016, did not ultimately choose any of the foreign policy vectors proposed by influential world powers (pro-Russian, pan-Turkic, Eurasian, European, American) as the main.

A brief analysis of the literature on the subject of the study shows the diversity of aspects and researchers' points of view. R. Weitz (2018) writes about the active regional policy of the new leadership of Uzbekistan which is supported by other states in the region and which can serve as a pledge for the development of mutually beneficial economic relations on a long-term basis and, and may lead to an increase in powerful states' competition in Uzbekistan<sup>2</sup>. E. Troitskiy (2008) considers the reasons and circumstances of the change in the foreign policy course of Uzbekistan which took place in 2004-2009 and analyzes the subsequent evolution of Tashkent's foreign policy from that time<sup>3</sup>. S. Peyrouse (2016) writes about China's growing presence and influence in Central Asia partially structures the domestic orders, social changes, and national narratives of the latter<sup>4</sup>.

N. Bekmurzaev (2019) talks about changes in Uzbekistan's foreign policy after Karimov and many changes that are indeed significant, including the prioritizing Central Asia and better engage with the neighbors<sup>5</sup>. S. A. Cornell (2000) writes about the problems of regional unity in Central Asia and the paradox

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2 Weitz R., *Uzbekistan's New Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity under New Leadership* // URL: <http://isdpeu/publication/uzbekistans-new-foreign-policy/>

3 Troitskiy E.F. *The Foreign Policy of Uzbekistan in 2004-2007: from a strategic partnership with the United States to allied relations with Russia* // *Bulletin of Tomsk State University*. 2008. № 310. P. 93-97

4 Peyrouse S. *Discussing China: sinophilia and sinophobia in Central Asia*. *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 7. 2016. P. 14-23.

5 Bekmurzaev N. *What To Expect From Uzbekistan's New Concept Of Foreign Policy?* // URL: <https://cabar.asia/en/what-to-expect-from-uzbekistan-s-new-concept-of-foreign-policy/>

of Uzbekistan's position in regional community which is that Tashkent wants to play a significant coordinating role in solving the key issues in the region but it usually doesn't bring any result because Uzbekistan's strategy differs from other states' one<sup>6</sup>. M. Laumulin (2010) analyzes the Central Asian policy of the USA at the presidency of B. Obama, the main components of which is strengthening influence on Central Asia in the framework of the Afghanistan problem, and besides about the US considering Uzbekistan the main actor in the region<sup>7</sup>. A. Malashenko (2012) analyzes the policy of Uzbekistan in the Central Asia, and various aspects of its integration with the states in the region<sup>8</sup>. R. Vakulchuk, senior fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Relations, in his interview talks about integration in Central Asia and Uzbekistan's role in it, and about economic development in the region<sup>9</sup>. So, the study of such a complex object as the foreign policy of Uzbekistan requires the researcher to use a systematic and comprehensive methodology.

The basis of my research methodology is a case study analysis aimed at studying the foreign policy strategy of Uzbekistan as a "special case" of a deliberate foreign policy choice of a sovereign state that resulted from the comprehension of the main opportunities and challenges that were actualized after Uzbekistan gained its independence in 1992. The research methods I use (qualitative, comparative, SWOT-analysis, etc.) contribute to the implementation of case study analysis. For this purpose I will use such methods like historical, system, comparative, analytical, statistical analysis, and expert survey. Moreover, my work will be based on comparative analyses. The qualitative analysis is made to study in-depth of collected information.

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6 Cornell Svante E. "Uzbekistan: A Regional Player in Eurasian Geopolitics?" // *European Security*. 2000. № 9 (2). 115 p.

7 Laumulin M. *U.S. Central Asian Policy Under President Barack Obama // Central Asia and the Caucasus*. Volume 11. Issue 4. 2010. P. 1-14.

8 Malashenko A.V. *Central Asia: what does Russia expect? // Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN)*, 2012. 118 p.

9 Vakulchuk R. *Strategic Forecasting vs. Scenario Planning // <https://cabar.asia/en/roman-vakulchuk-strategic-forecasting-vs-scenario-planning/>*.



This in its turn can help me to understand, the nature and characteristics of the formation of Uzbekistan's foreign policy. A comparative analysis will help me understand how the foreign policy and relations with states has been forming and how it has changed since the independence of Uzbekistan.

The methods that I will use in order to gather information are:

1. Qualitative research –aiming at collecting data on Uzbekistan's foreign policy and its relations with states and finding the theoretical background to the main research question;
2. Comparative analysis –suggesting analysis of the existing internal and external factors, opportunities and threats; system analysis- foreign policy of Uzbekistan as the basis of the system of priorities and certain (external policy of Uzbekistan as a system of priorities, objectives of the task, supported by certain decisions and actions) decisions; SWOT-analysis, case study-special case of the foreign policy strategy of Uzbekistan on the basis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the state existing since gaining independence.

I consider the foreign policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan of the period under study as a system of priorities, goals and objectives, formed by combining the methods of long-term planning, prompt and anticipating response to external challenges, as well as forecasting and evaluating emerging opportunities and threats.

I choose the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan as an object for comparison, which since its independence has been multi-vector in nature and implies the simultaneous active integration of this country into several projects initiated by world “force centers” - in order to balance their influence and preserve the well-known “freedom maneuver” in domestic and foreign policy. At the same time, the foreign policy strategy of the Republic of Uzbekistan since its independence was different, being aimed at distancing (equidistance) from the world “centers of power”, implied the refusal to participate

in the blocks and the priority of bilateral relations with other countries - with the aim of strengthening the country's foreign policy positions and creating favorable conditions for internal development (modernization) due to the preferential use of its own resources. A change in the foreign policy strategy of Uzbekistan seems possible due to a change in the aggregate of factors that predetermined its character in the period 1992-2016. At the same time, SWOT-analysis is considered by me as a modification of factor analysis, and is intended to help me better systematize and summarize data on the totality of favorable and unfavorable factors that determined the nature and focus of Uzbekistan's foreign policy strategy in the period under consideration in my work, as well as forecast its possible changes after 2016. Inductive method –used to observe, compare and classify information in order to come to a concrete answer (as well as generalizations and conclusions) to my article in conclusion.

I prefer to use such scientist theories as a base of my research work:

1. Neorealism, considering the state as an independent and independent player in the international arena, guided by its own interests and opportunities;
2. the theory of political games, from the point of which the process of building a political strategy of Uzbekistanis considered as a game with a non-zero amount;
3. The concept of internal geopolitics, available resources as a factor of strengthening the unity of the country (consolidation of its political and economic territory), a tool to strengthen its position in the system of international relations.

In connection with the change of leadership in the end of 2016, the Republic of Uzbekistan is undergoing an internal and foreign policy revision process and a repositioning process in the world, which may be due to certain changes in the nature and direction of the country's foreign policy. The analyzed previous experience of the formation of the foreign policy

course of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the possible changes in the country's relations with the power centers and neighbors in Central Asia seem relevant. As Uzbekistan is located in the center of Central Asia and borders with all the Central Asian states. Any change in its discourse can be noticeable in the international arena. There is a certain limit to the use of methodology and SWOT-analysis, no need to exaggerate the value of some factors in relation to others. Documents related to foreign policy decisions should be considered in a certain political concept.

The presented article has three objectives. The first is to analyze and identify, explore the features of the formation of foreign policy in the period of independence. The second is to identify and investigate the main factors influencing the formation of the foreign policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the study period. The third is to identify and analyze the prerequisites and prospects for changes in the foreign policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the modern period. To achieve these objectives I will set the following questions: 1. What factors have caused Uzbekistan's adherence to certain fundamental principles of the foreign policy strategy (certain distance from the world's «centers of power» and a desire to balance their influence on the country, non-alignment, priority of bilateral relations with other countries and adherence to intra-regional integration in the Central Asian region)? Why Uzbekistan, until recently, refused to consistently engage in large-scale integration projects launched after 1992 (the Pan-Turkist project under the auspices of Turkey, the Eurasian project under the auspices of Russia and Kazakhstan, the European Union's roadmap project, etc.)? Is it possible to change the foreign policy strategy of Uzbekistan formulated in a similar way in the near future, and what conditions are needed for this? 2. Is it possible in the near future to overcome the contradictions that exist between the countries of the Central Union - with their return to the joint project of Central Asian integration

and with subsequent joining to larger integration projects covering the Central Asian region? 3. Is it possible to optimize relations between Uzbekistan and China as the largest trading and investment partner - including the correlation of Uzbek plans for industrial and innovative development with possible involvement in the One Belt and One Road project?

Among other characteristic features of the foreign policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan of the independence period, it is also possible to highlight:

- the desire to get rid of the Soviet “origin” of the “matrix” of dependence;
- the desire to minimize the risks associated with foreign policy decisions and choices;
- the desire to prevent skewing in favor of any one of the external centers of influence (USA, Russia, EU, etc.);
- deideologization of foreign policy contacts, the priority of economic motives and national security interests when making foreign policy decisions;
- considerable attention to regional security issues in the Central Asian region and in adjacent countries and regions;
- consideration of intra-regional integration in the CAR region as one of the priorities in foreign policy;
- the desire to use foreign policy as a significant factor in the socio-economic modernization of the country.

As an independent state, Uzbekistan went through several major periods in the formation of its foreign policy, among which are: a period of re-positioning and consolidation of the status of Uzbekistan as an independent state with a gradual weakening of Russian influence (1992-1999), a period of revision of relations with the Russian Federation and partial rapprochement with the United States and Western countries (1999-2005), a period of distancing from the United States and Federation with a simultaneous strengthening of the vector of Eurasian integration (2005-2011), the period of refusal to participate in the Eurasian project and return to the strategy of

distancing from the world “centers of power” (2012-2016); a period of re-positioning and understanding the results of the previously conducted foreign policy course, accompanied by the diversification of the directions of foreign policy activity of Uzbekistan (2016 - up to the present). After 2016, the process of modifying the strategy of balancing equidistance in strengthening the dialogue component of foreign policy, expanding ties with traditional (China, Russia, EU, etc.) and new foreign partners of the Republic of Uzbekistan, resolving disputes with neighbors in the Central Asian region and striving to activate (reload) the process of intraregional economic integration in the CARs.

The territory and the population did not allow Uzbekistan to follow the «joining car» strategy used by some small countries. The transformation and periodic adaptation of foreign policy to changing circumstances was also facilitated by the gradually discovered impossibility of implementing foreign policy projects in which Uzbekistan initially participated or allowed for its participation in them. Thus, for example, a possible close economic cooperation with Russia became unrealizable due to the choice of the liberal monetarist strategy in economic policy by the Russian government, coupled with the forced exclusion of Uzbekistan from the “ruble zone”. In turn, the disappointment of Uzbekistan in the prospects of the Pan-Turkic vector was due to the limited geo-economic potential of Turkey, coupled with the ambiguity of certain figures associated with Turkish influence in Central Asia (F. Gulen). Uzbekistan’s refusal to participate in the CSTO was associated with disappointment in the ability of this union to promote the provision of information to Uzbekistan, given the large-scale terrorist challenges the country faced in 1999. The failure of the initial version of the Central Asian Union’s project was caused by the failed strategic partnership of Uzbekistan with Kazakhstan and the unilateral decisions of some other Central Asian countries (one-time accession of Kyrgyzstan to WTO in 1998). In turn, the need

to consolidate the internal economic space and modernize the internal transport infrastructure prompted Uzbekistan not to rush into integration into the global economic space and with participation in large-scale transnational and cross-border projects. With the passing of President Karimov of Uzbekistan in early September 2016 and the appointment of Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev as caretaker interim president of Uzbekistan, discussions among policy makers and analysts have focused on how these events will influence Uzbekistan's foreign and domestic policies. Uzbekistan's foreign policy under President Karimov has been framed in a variety of ways. While in the early years of Uzbekistan's independence, policy makers and analysts saw Uzbek foreign policy priorities as emphasizing the importance of Russia and Turkey, they were later reconsidered in light of perceived threats from Turkey and a lack of commitment by Russia. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, analysts identified support as shifting towards the US and European initiatives. The US criticism of the Uzbek government's treatment of the 2005 Andijan events and Western-backed color revolutions pushed Uzbekistan towards closer economic and political ties with Russia, China and South Korea, while the US and European initiatives were treated as potentially threatening to Uzbek sovereignty. With intensification of the Russian Eurasian initiative and the Chinese Silk Road (One Belt One Road) project in the latter 2000s, Uzbekistan moved to balance such Russian and Chinese influences by gradually improving US ties to diversify its external partners. With Mirziyoyev's appointment as interim president in 2016, speculations appeared in Russian and other media sources suggesting that Uzbekistan will move closer to Russia because of close personal ties between the interim president and Russian elites. However, based on early statements by the interim president, Uzbekistan is committed to the general foreign policy of Karimov's presidency and will build its international engagements depending on how the images of Uzbekistan's "self" and

the external “other” are constructed in the process of social interaction with these powers. Initial discussions focused on the fact that, although Uzbekistan is in Russia’s ‘backyard’, the Russian government lacked the resources to enforce its foreign policy ambitions in the country and the region in the early 1990s. The diversification of Uzbekistan’s relations with states other than Russia resulted in discussions about challenges to Russian domination and attempts to fill in the gap left by Russia’s “withdrawal” from the region. As part of this discussion, any attempts by the EU and the US to engage these states resulted in an imaginary resurrected “New Great Game” in this region. Similarly, the rise of states like China and India has resulted in references to Great Power “Great Games”. Even liberal ideas related to the spread of democracy and human rights were often regarded in this region as a Western tool of penetration aiming to constrain and pressure the Russian sphere of influence. This narrative of US-Russia rivalry for influence in Uzbekistan is further illuminated by China’s rise and the impact of the SCO on this region. In the latter half of the 2000s, the discussion was dominated by how Russia and China will oppose US interests in this part of the world and simultaneously reconcile their differences over how this region should be developed. In all of these interpretations, Uzbekistan is seen as a weak state, while China and Russia balance against the US and at times against each other. From the beginning Uzbekistan constructed its foreign policy in a way that uses the principle of non-alignment with military and political blocks and non-intervention in the affairs of neighboring states. And this Karimov-era principle was reinstated by interim President Mirziyoyev in his first address to the joint session of chambers of parliament in September 2016. Second, Uzbekistan’s main priorities lie in improving and maintaining its relations with neighboring Central Asian states as an area of vital importance for Uzbekistan. Such a prioritization closely follows the general foreign policy of Uzbekistan in the Karimov years.

The main directions of foreign policy and foreign economic activity of Uzbekistan after 2016:

A) Development of Uzbekistan's relations with the SCO: participation in the work of institutions, dialogue on regional security issues, discussion of opportunities and influence in the SCO free trade zone.

B) Participation in the settlement of the "Afghan problem" (within the framework of the agreement "6+3"), helping to stabilize the situation inside and around Afghanistan.

C) Development of multilateral cooperation between Uzbekistan and China: cooperation in the fight against extremism and regional separatism, discussion of possible forms of Uzbekistan's participation in the "Silk Road Economic Belt", working to attract Chinese investments in large industrial and investment projects in the within the framework of Uzbekistan's industrial modernization program. Development of bilateral cooperation in trade and economic, energy, transport, scientific and technical, cultural and humanitarian, agricultural fields.

D) Relations between Uzbekistan and the United States: development of military-technical cooperation, cooperation in the field of energy, cooperation in the fields of law and trade, culture and medicine.

E) Development of bilateral relations with Russia: development of dialogue on regional security issues, cooperation in the field of extraction and transportation of energy resources, development of a free trade zone with the participation of the two countries, cooperation in the cultural and educational sphere.

G) Relations with the EU: gradual expansion of dialogue in the humanitarian sphere, work with European investors in the framework of ongoing and promising projects.

I) Development of strategic partnership with the Republic of Korea (implementation of the provisions of the bilateral agreement concluded in 2017) relations between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: settlement of disputes, coordination of po-



sitions on the processes of intraregional integration in the Central Asia Region and in the development of transregional cooperation.

R) Development of intraregional cooperation within the Central Asian region: normalization of relations and resolution of disputes in relations with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, participation in joint industrial (agricultural engineering, automotive), energy and communication projects; development of transregional cooperation and the formation of a single space of transport communications in the Central Asian Region.

Uzbekistan is getting step by step the most important country in the Central Asian region, especially in terms of regional economic development. But each country has its own national interests, settlement the good relations with neighbors is necessary to move forward for settlement water problem, border disputes and effectively building of transportation networks. Because of that, all regional states, including Uzbekistan, should be ready to compromise and look beyond their current profits.

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**Development issues of Siberia: does the “big region” have perspectives?**

**Abstract.** The article discusses possible alternative development strategies that could form the basis of a fundamentally new regional policy of Russia. The author addresses this issue in the context of a mega-project on the creation of State Corporation for the Development of Siberia and the Far East claimed recently by the federal authorities. The author analyzes this project in terms of its ability to provide the progressive development of the regions of Siberia and the Far East, ensure flexible alignment of federal and regional interests.

**Key words:** Siberia, the Far East, regionalism, regional strategy, regional development, regional policy, State Corporation, technocracy, centralism.

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**Проблемы развития Сибири: есть ли у «большого региона» перспективы?**

**Аннотация.** В статье рассматриваются возможные альтернативные стратегии развития, которые могли бы стать основой принципиально новой региональной политики России. Автор рассматривает этот вопрос в контексте мегапроекта о создании Государственной корпорации по развитию Сибири и Дальнего Востока, заявленного недавно федеральными властями. Автор анализирует данный проект с точки зрения его способности обеспечить поступательное развитие регионов Сибири и Дальнего Востока, обеспечить гибкое согласование федеральных и региональных интересов.

**Ключевые слова:** Сибирь, Дальний Восток, регионализм, региональная стратегия, региональное развитие, региональная политика, государственная корпорация, технократия, централизм.

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## **Development issues of Siberia: does the “big region” have perspectives?\***

In today's situation, a solid amount of research interpreting the phenomenon of globalization focus on interpretation of phenomena that are closely related to it such as diverse streams, movements and the process of deterritorialization. Such analysis in the first place denies fixed forms of territorial organization as well as various demonstrations of the centralized government regulatory policy. Last but not least, this analysis also looks at how closely the modern stage of globalization is connected with various types of transformation of territorial organization at different subglobal levels. Based on criticism of conventional approaches to studying spatial-territorial organization, some researches have come to the statement that the process of reterritorialization, including the processes of reconfiguration, restructuring and rescaling at such levels of subglobal organization as cities and states, should be viewed as a vital part of the process of globalization<sup>1</sup>. Based on the recognized classical works of David Harvey<sup>2</sup> and Henri Lefe-

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**Проблемы развития Сибири: есть ли у «большого региона» перспективы?**

1 Neil Brenner, «Globalisierung und Reterritorialisierung» in Grenzen in den internationalen Beziehungen, ed. Raimund Kraemer (Potsdam, WeltTrends, 2009 (Welt Trends Lehrtexte 14). 73 p.

2 David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (New York, 1982).

bvre<sup>3</sup>, modern researchers develop their arguments within the framework of the ongoing debate on various ways and forms of reterritorialization in the context of today's globalization. In these works, globalization as well as reterritorialization are viewed in the context of the development of socio-economic, and political and institutional spaces as phenomena slowly moving to higher intersecting geographic levels and measurements, including already existing regions and emerging interregional bodies<sup>4</sup>. Processes directly related to globalization such as time-space compression, speeding up of the turnover time of capital, goods and services, as well as increase of the mobility of human resources will call for rescaling the existing regions that will enable them to become full-fledged entities of innovative development.

According to the author, both the traditional centralized bureaucratic type of the state and the traditional type of the region (established with account of a limited number of criteria), facing critical shortages of development resources and incapable of independent positioning in the context of the processes at the national and global levels, are going through a crisis in today's process of globalization. Modern processes will call for a new type of the region that has a full-fledged status of identity and that is formed with account of numerous factors (natural and climatic, socio-economic, ethnocultural, identity, etc.). Awareness of the importance of creating regions of a new type has been happening in foreign political science over the last few decades.

At the same time, many researchers justified the need to

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3 Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991); Henri Lefebvre, *Les contradictions de l'Etat modern. La dialectique de l'Etat*, Vol. 4 of 4 *De l'Etat*. (Paris, UGE, 1978).

4 John Anderson, «The shifting stage of politics: new medieval and post-modern territorialities?», *Environmental Planning*, 1996. № 14 (2). P. 133-153; Philip G. Cerny, «Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action», *International Organization* 49 (4, autumn 1995), P. 595-625; Robert W. Cox, «Structural issues of global governance: implications for Europe» in *Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations*, ed. Stephan Gill (Cambridge, 1993).

increase the role of regions in modern politics by connecting it to the requirements to expand and improve democracy as well as to the increased interest in such a phenomenon as “the productive force of territorial organization”<sup>5</sup>.

Recognition of the increased political role of subnational units expanding their autonomy contributed towards the approval of the strategy of domestic governmental decentralization that has been consistently implemented in all spheres of life of European societies and states<sup>6</sup>.

Other researchers spoke about enhancing the regional independence with the increase of their capabilities to influence the process of national governance<sup>7</sup>.

However, there is an area of research that focuses on strengthening of “cooperation and responsibility for oneself” and on the concept of “reforming through regionalization”<sup>8</sup>.

Other researchers put emphasis on studying policies supporting regions in the EU as an alternative of a successful decentralized and innovative strategy<sup>9</sup>.

Other researchers focus on studying capabilities of private actors capable of influencing the nature of social and political

5 Eric A.M. Swingedouw, Territorial organisation and the space/technology nexus. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 17. 1992. 431 p.; Eric A.M. Swingedouw, Towards Global Localization: The Computing and Communications Industries in Britain and France. (London: University College London Press, 1992).

6 Yves Meny (Ed.) Dix ans de decentralization en Europe. Bilan et perspectives (Paris, Cujas, 1982).

7 Angelika Poth-Moegeler, Das Prinzip der «Partnerschaft» in der Strukturpolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Frankfurt am Main, 1993); Gary Marks, «Politikmuster und Einflusslogik in der Strukturpolitik» in Europäische Integration, ed. Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch (Opladen, 1996, ss. 313-343); Ingeborg Tommel, Staatliche Regulierung und europäische Integration. Die Regionalpolitik der EG und ihre Implementation in Italien (Baden-Baden, 1994); Nicola Steack, «Die europäische Strukturpolitik in einem föderalen Staat – am Beispiel des Bundeslandes Niedersachsen» in Hubert Heinelt. Politiknetzwerke und europäische Strukturpolitik. Ein Vergleich zwischen EU-Mitgliedstaaten (Opladen, 1996, ss. 75-108).

8 Heinz Kruse, Reform durch Regionalisierung. Eine politische Antwort auf die Umstrukturierung der Wirtschaft. (Frankfurt am Maine, New York, 1990); Joachim J. Hesse (Ed.), Regionen in Europa. Die Institutionalisierung des Regionalausschusses (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996. Bd. 1).

9 Helmut Voelzkov, Mehr Technik in die Region. Neue Ansaetze zur regionalen Technikfoerderung in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Wiesbaden, 1990).

relations at different territorial levels<sup>10</sup>.

A number of researchers raise the issue of specific forms and “structural” bases of the multilevel governance model since the previous hierarchical order reproduced by the centralized states is slowly fading into the past. Diverse horizontal and vertical networks linking different European regions to the formation of new territorial and economic units — macro-regions, or “big regions” — were recognized as the structural bases and mechanism for integration of the multilevel governance system<sup>11</sup>.

“Big regions” forming in such a way are considered by researchers as key actors of a new cross-border governance system, stimulating capabilities of national states by pooling sovereignty to intensify cross-border networking and economic cooperation, transfer of technology, cultural cooperation and creation of hybrid forms of a representative democracy<sup>12</sup>.

What, according to the author, is the role of “big regions” in today’s situation and how can they contribute to restructuring and rescaling of political and economic spaces? They seem to be capable of becoming the basis for creation of a more flexible and adaptive territorial matrix, able to respond quickly to global trends and stimulate socio-economic development on a national scale. In addition, they:

1. Can act as a principally new effective and capable agent and object of regional policies of modern states.
2. In the long term, can become a structural basis of a new, improved system of administrative-territorial division of modern states.

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10 Charles F. Sabel, *Regional Prosperities Compared: Massachusetts and Baden-Wurttemberg in the 1980s* (Berlin, 1987); Gernot Grabner (Ed.). *The Embedded Firm. On the Socio-economics of Industrial Networks* (London-New York, 1993).

11 Arthur Benz, «Politikverflechtung ohne Politikverflechtungsfalle – Koordination und Strukturpolitik im europaischen Mehrebenensystem» in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 39, 1998. P. 558-589.

12 Olivier Th. Kramsch, «Introduction. Postnational Politics in the European Union» in *Geopolitics*, 2004. Vol. 9. № 3. 535 p.

3. Can provide a new quality of vertical and horizontal links within the single space of particular countries.
4. Can become a structural basis of new, more effective and balanced federalism models.
5. Can provide new opportunities in processes of transregional and transborder cooperation.
6. Can effectively and successfully integrate into the world economic, social, cultural and information spaces on the basis of diverse networking.
7. Can effectively consolidate development resources of a particular space, provide efficient reproduction of economic, social and cultural capital within this space.
8. Devoid of meaning, to a certain extent, regional separatism as a phenomenon, providing territories and levels of territorial divisions constituting modern states with new development opportunities.
9. Can become a significant link of the emerging today multilevel governance system promoting effective interactions among its global, national and local levels.
10. Can adopt, implement and independently generate innovations in various spheres of public life.

However, one issue that remains open is the question of methodology that can be used to study big regions and establish basic criteria and principles of forming these criteria.

In Russia, the model of economic macro-regions is an optimal model that meets basic globalization trends and needs of national development. With account of the unbalanced nature of its regional system and imperfect system of administrative-territorial division, Russia is not able to create stable and effective federalism of a classical type, however, the return to unitarianism so familiar to Russia is not possible today.

Evolutionary and continued establishment of the system of big regions with account of socio-economic and cultural-identity criteria is seen as an appropriate solution in this situation. In this case, the core power-administrative and coordination



resource that federal districts have can be supplemented by a combination of horizontal links established in the 1990–2000s by interregional associations of economic cooperation. Overlapping of vertical administrative and horizontal economic networks would provide a cumulative effect contributing to the establishment of economic macro-regions and consolidation of development resources that the constituent territories possess. The emerging economic macro-regions which could over time turn into an additional functional level of the Russian regional system, and, in the longer term, become a structural basis of the updated model of Russian federalism.

“Big regions” were studied in the former USSR and in modern Russia. In the Soviet Union, they were mainly studied from the economic geography perspective. Theory and methodology of economic zoning of both the USSR and other countries were reflected in the works of N. N. Baransky (1881–1963), a founder of economic geography)<sup>13</sup>. In modern Russia, they become an object of study of such political subdiscipline as internal geopolitics that studies main factors defining an internal development capacity of the states<sup>14</sup>. While analyzing territorial-political establishment of modern Russia, specialists from different fields of science divide the country’s territorial space into geopolitical (containing a long-term geopolitical issue), administrative (enjoying the established constitutional and legal status and being a part of the country’s governance system) and economic (possessing a steady set of natural and resource, and economic characteristics) regions<sup>15</sup>.

In some way, an issue of the formation of the state regional policy as closely corresponding to the realities of Russia as possible, is not just an issue of high-quality development, but

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13 Nicolay N. Baransky, *Selected works. Rise of Soviet economic geography.* (M., Mysl, 1980).

14 Vladimir A. Kolosov, Nicolay A. Mironenko, *Geopolitics and political geography.* (M., Aspect-Press, 2002).

15 Leonid G. Olekh, «Concept of democratic legal regionalism» in *Culture and democracy: Proceedings of the international conference and round table.* // Novosibirsk, 1996. 8 p.

is closely linked to the issue of its future existence. The author believes that the strategic objective of the Russian state is to contribute in a comprehensive way to consolidation of macro-economic macro-regions, involving them in the process of country's federative building and modernization, and at the same time to contribute to their full and mutually advantageous integration into the global economy. We strongly believe that Siberia is not only a natural and geographic, but also an economic macro-region with a potential full-scale impact on the Russian and world political and economic processes. However, an essential condition for this is consolidation of the necessary development resources with the purpose to achieve its full-fledged identity in the single political and socio-economic space of Russia. But without changing strategic approaches of the federal Centre, consolidation of Siberia as a full-fledged macro-region (as well as other country's potential "big regions") is hardly possible. Therefore, the policy of Russian authorities regarding Siberia and the overall situation in this region are important indicators of the general state of the Russian regional policy.

### **SIBERIA: DEVELOPMENT ISSUES**

Today Siberia occupies 40 % of Russian territory and is rich in large reserves of natural resources, unique in terms of their composition and quality. Even in contemporary crisis conditions, Siberia's gross domestic product is more than 1.2 times higher than the Russian average GDP per capita. This positions the region as one of the leading regions in the country's economy<sup>16</sup>.

One of the principal factors defining economic growth opportunities in the Siberian region is the enormous resource potential. Projected Russian economic growth and demand for many kinds of resources from the world economy can foster development of the Siberian economy for 25–30 and

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16 1 Valery S. Efimov, Alexandr V. Efimov, «Siberia in modern Russia» // URL: [http://foresight.sfu-kras.ru/sites/foresight.sfu-kras.ru/files/Statya\\_Sibir\\_v\\_sovremennoy\\_Rossii.pdf](http://foresight.sfu-kras.ru/sites/foresight.sfu-kras.ru/files/Statya_Sibir_v_sovremennoy_Rossii.pdf)

more years, provided that numerous current obstacles would be addressed.

Recoverable crude oil reserves in Siberia amount to 77 % of the Russian reserves, natural gas — 85 %, coal — 80 %, wood — 50 %, copper — 70 %, nickel — 68 %, lead — 86 %, zinc — 77 %, molybdenum — 82 %, gold — 41 %, platinum group metals — 99 %. Siberia has 45 % of Russia's hydro-electric power potential<sup>17</sup>.

The regional policy aimed at the development of Siberia should be first of all aimed towards self-reliant integrated economy being a part of Russia's economic space and providing a comfortable environment, high living standards, and towards ensuring the effective participation of Siberia in tackling Russian issues, satisfying domestic market needs and arranging export of different resources.

At the same time, as many experts agree, in the current circumstances, without strategies of the regional settlement and development, Siberian regions will not be able to reach a sustainable growth path that may enable the region to become an engine of development for the Russian economy<sup>18</sup>, since factors preventing a more dynamic and better development of the region are diverse and long-term.

Despite the significant resource potential and partly available industrial and human capacity, most Siberian regions today are unattractive for investment due to "deep in-land" location, insufficient development of the communication system linking them to regions in the European part of Russia, gradual loss and degradation of human capacity and a negative migration phenomenon. It should be also borne in mind that so far significant territories of Siberia, especially of its eastern part, have remained undeveloped, and it is very unlikely that they would be developed by one nation regardless of their natural resources wealth. For example, estimates for Udokan copper

17 Alexey E. Kontorovich, «A Strategic issues of Siberia's fuel and energy complex in Science» in *Siberia*. № 50 (2386). 2002.

18 .Boris Lavrovsky, «Does Russia need Siberia»? in *Expert*, 2004. № 13.

deposit in Zabaikalie (with copper content in mercury of 30 %) performed early in the 1980s by no longer existing Central Scientific Research Economic Institute under RSFSR Gosplan (State Planning Committee) showed that development costs will be recovered only in 40 years. At the same time, better developed large oil and gas deposits in Western Siberia are at their late development stage, meaning the decline of oil and gas production<sup>19</sup>. The share of hard-to-recover oil reserves amounts to 55–60 % and continues to increase, while some other deposits are almost depleted.

Up to this date, living conditions and living standards in Siberia are a lot worse than in the European part of the country. The territory of Siberia is sparsely populated (only 14.3 % of the Russian population in 2009), its transport development is insufficient. The macro-regional economy is considerably distorted towards raw materials extraction and initial stages of processing. Moreover, the socio-economic position of Siberian regions is sharply differentiated: among them are the most developed and more developed regions (Tyumensk Region, the Krasnoyarsk Territory, etc.) and lagging regions (the Republic of Tyva).

Habitable territories within the Siberian macro-region are limited and even hundreds of years after their development started they represent just a narrow strip in the south along the Trans-Siberian Railway, 100–200 km wide in some locations. However, economically developed and habitable areas are not joint, there are vast, almost undeveloped spaces between them (this is especially typical for regions in Eastern Siberia).

The territory of the Siberian Federal District is very big (5,145,000 sq. m) and therefore it is economically not consolidated, it lacks a linking natural waterway (such as the Volga river for the regions in the Privolzhsky Federal District),

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19 «Oil and gas industry raw materials base of Siberia and main areas of its reproduction for the period up to 2030» // URL: <http://www.ipgg.sbras.ru/ru/files/publications/userfiles/publ-syrevaya-baza-neftyanoy-i-gazovoy-promyshlennosti-sibiri-019232.pdf?action=download>.

while intraregional communications are not properly developed. Habitable territories within the Siberian macro-region are limited and even hundreds of years after their development started they represent just a narrow strip in the south along the Trans-Siberian Railway, 100–200 km wide in some locations. However, economically developed and habitable areas are not joint, there are vast almost undeveloped spaces between them (this is especially typical for regions in Eastern Siberia). Despite several powerful economic centres in the region that could become “an engine of growth” (Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Omsk, Tomsk, Irkutsk, Novokuznetsk, etc.), a lack of coordination of their resources and efforts within a single regional policy (or wider, a federal policy) deprives Siberia of a number of positive opportunities. Moreover, a growing gap in economic and social indicators between the dynamic and relatively advantaged north of Siberia and the depressive and underprivileged south, between actively developing resource regions and extremely crisis agricultural regions by no means facilitate the macro-region to reach a sustainable growth path.

A few economic crises suffered by Russia over the last three decades have made the problems of socio-economic lagging and downfall of Siberia more apparent. The region is facing a choice between a more increasingly relative stability of the “crisis development” and a backsliding to a deeper and irreversible socio-economic degradation. However, the 20th century experience showed that a raw materials region lagging in social development cannot have a comfortable and prospering existence in the long term<sup>20</sup>. Continuation of the inertial scenario can only lead to further impoverishment of Siberia which will be accompanied by decrease in the population (due to fertility reduction and migration to Central Russia), destruction of the industrial, scientific and educational potential. Therefore, the request addressed to the federal authorities to coordinate

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20 Vladislav Inozemtsev, Ilya Ponomarev I., Vladimir Ryzhkov, «Continent-Siberia» // Kievsky Telegraph, 2013. 18 April.

processes of socio-economic development appears to be fair and rational — Siberia and the Far East clearly lack their own development resources or mechanisms and infrastructure for their effective use. In this situation, a deeper reflexion regarding the causes of “the cyclical decline” of the Siberian macro-region and finding solutions to overcome this situation is very relevant.

What is the cause of long-term “lagging” and a closed cycle of the “crisis development”? As experience of the regional development and regional policy of the last 20 years shows, Siberian and Far Eastern territories do not fall under a strategy of territorial self-determination, or a sectoral approach, or a strategy of “competitive federalism” of the 1990s that caused a deep crisis in industrial and social spheres of most regions. It is also important to identify the causes of such lagging.

**The first cause** is specific territorial configuration of the Siberian macro-region. The territory of the Siberian Federal District is very big (5,145,000 sq. m) and therefore it is economically not consolidated, it lacks a linking natural waterway (such as the Volga river for the regions in the Privolzhskiy Federal District), while intraregional communications are not properly developed. Habitable territories within the Siberian macro-region are limited and even hundreds of years after their development started they represent just a narrow strip in the south along the Trans-Siberian Railway, 100–200 km wide in some locations. However, economically developed and habitable areas are not joint, there are vast, almost undeveloped spaces between them (this is especially typical for regions in Eastern Siberia). Despite several powerful economic centres in the region that could become “an engine of growth” (Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Omsk, Tomsk, Irkutsk, Novokuznetsk, etc.), a lack of coordination of their resources and efforts within a single regional policy (or wider, a federal policy) deprives Siberia of a number of positive opportunities. Moreover, a growing gap in economic and social indicators between dynamic

and relatively advantaged north of Siberia and depressive and underprivileged south, between actively developing resource regions and extremely crisis agricultural regions by no means facilitate the macro-region to reach a sustainable growth path.

**The second cause** is territorial remoteness of Siberia from markets of Europe and Central Russia (that is especially experienced in the situation with unsettled transportation tariffs), and a climate not quite favourable for intense economic activity<sup>21</sup>. Thus, due to harsh climate conditions 30 % of the cost of one unit of output contribute to heating, transportation over long distances adds another 15–20 % of expenses. As a result, all of this is translated into the price, while competitiveness of Siberian goods is 1.5 times lower than the Russian average.

**The third cause** is mainly a raw materials character of the development of the Siberian region that turns it for a long period of time into a raw materials appendage of the European part of Russia in the framework of the “dependent development” model<sup>22</sup>. It resulted in centralized investment in a limited number of “monocultural productions” with the chronic underfunding of the social sphere — medicine, education, science and culture; the latter has been hitting as a boomerang until now, reducing the opportunity for the region to adapt to new market conditions. Today, Siberians are 15 % behind the European part of the country in terms of social benefits. According to some researchers, not only Siberia, but entire Russia will not be able to reach the modern social standards within the framework of the extensive development model<sup>23</sup>. That is the inevitable logic of the so-called “raw materials state”.

**The fourth cause** is specific features and consequences of the government policy regarding Siberia related to poor long-

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21 See: Evgeny N. Starikov, «A fight of bulldogs behind the scenes» in *Nash Sovremennik*, 1996. № 9. P. 101-105; Andrey P. Parshev, *Why is Russia not America.* // M., 2000. P. 37-52.

22 Yuri P. Ivonin, «State and society in Russia in the 17th-20th centuries: Stages of interaction» in *From the Middle Ages to the Early Modern Period: Ethnosocial processes in Siberia in the 17th–early 20th centuries.* // Novosibirsk, 2005. 166 p..

23 Vladimir V. Timakov, «A black hole of the consumer society» in *Russian East*, 1995. № 13.

term planning and resource development. In particular, the regional policy in the Soviet period was considered as a tool to carry out large-scale domestic political and economic tasks of the state (modernization, resource mobilization, strengthening the country's international position) which, however, was quite costly for the population. During all periods of the Soviet time, a technocratic type clearly prevailed. It had two main subtypes: mobilization (concentration of all resources in the Centre with their allocation for priority projects within the forced development strategy) and economic-technocratic (taking specificity of regions into account and based on the principles of economic zoning).

Centralized planning was oriented towards attaining optimal conditions for the performance of specific industries, rather than regions or society in general. As a result, the command-administrative system found itself in historical conflict with geographic, resource and sociocultural specificity of Siberia as well as with the key concepts of a hierarchical control theory<sup>24</sup>.

At the same time, a technocratic approach with centralized funding of development projects gave certain advantages to the Siberian region for quite a long time. The latter was most visible in the second half of the 20th century when development of the national economy of the USSR was significantly ensured by huge rise of mining and primary processing of minerals. Approaches of Gosplan specialists to economic zoning and planning of the socio-economic development of territories seemed to be sufficiently substantiated. As a result, between 1960 and 1986, the share of the territory to the East of the Urals in total Soviet GDP increased from 12.3 to 18.2 %, with average annual growth rate in the region of 5.1–6.5 %. A number of infrastructure projects were implemented: during this period thousands of kilometers of railways and motorways were built in Siberia that made Siberian towns suitable for liv-

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24 Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, *The Siberian Curse. How Communist Planners Left Russia out in the Cold.* (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 2003).



ing, the in-flow of population began. For the period between 1959 and 1989 the population of Western Siberia rose by one third, the population of Eastern Siberia — by 42 % (in Russia as a whole — by 25 %)<sup>25</sup>.

However, development of production forces in Siberia, as well as in the whole country, was still based on the principles of a mobilization development type that were laid out during the Great Patriotic War. Defense enterprises and heavy industry dominated in the economic structure, being supplemented by large-scale development of mineral deposits during the past decades of the Soviet era. In 1986, the share of heavy industry in the regional GDP exceeded 30 %, the share of mineral production — 20 %. The economic structure of the Siberian region remained unbalanced, the social sphere — underfunded<sup>26</sup>.

Thus, **the fifth cause** is chronic underfunding of the Siberian social sphere during the years of its intensive industrial development. According to renowned Russian sociologist Zh. T. Toshchenko, during the 1970–1980s the population of Siberia increased by 20 %, while infrastructure capacities increased only by 1.5 %<sup>27</sup>. Even if departments in case of exceptional urgency had to finance the construction of housing, everything else — shops, hospitals, kindergartens — was left at the discretion of the local authorities who lacked the necessary financial resources. (Since the time of czar Aleksey Mikhailovich, Siberia has been carrying out some kind of “prison service” because starting from the 17th century the legislation provided for the expulsion of dangerous criminal offenders, the sick and injured here, and that left an indelible mark on the Siberian gene pool)<sup>28</sup>. A consequence of this was fundamental degradation of human capital.

25 Economic development in the USSR in the 1950–1980s // URL: <http://www.stud-files.ru/preview/5841066/page:112>.

26 Sergey A. Nekrylov, Evgeny V. Lukov, Socio-economic development of Siberia in the post-war period. // Tomsk, 2012., P. 15-22.

27 Jean T. Toshchenko, Social reserves of labour. // M., 1989. 276 p.

28 Leonid I. Shinkarev – Leonid K. Polezhaev. «It will last my time»... in Literaturnaya Gazeta, 2006. № 34-35. 12 p.

**The sixth cause** is ambiguous consequences of liberal market reforms of the 1990s. Liberal reforms of the 1990s in the context of weakness of the state and inevitable, to that end, ineffectiveness of its policy just further exacerbated the regional development issues. Strong territories won, weak and underdeveloped territories survived large-scale deindustrialization and the associated “social degradation”. Most regions of the country during those years turned into disaster areas and hot spots of widespread social discontent which apparently did not contribute to addressing the development issues. Among the reasons of this phenomenon are the lack of development resources, severance of technological chains and economic ties, concentration of financial resources in metropolitan cities, unfavourable investment climate in most Siberian territories, and, finally, the lack on the part of the federal and regional authorities of a well-thought strategy to stimulate economic growth.

In one way or another, the Siberian regions most acutely suffered the effects of not too well elaborated market reforms and lacked the necessary resources and forces to adapt to a new situation.

First, many large industrial enterprises shut down or were close to shut-down, including Kuzbass mines, Krasnoyarsk Heavy Engineering Plant, Krasnoyarsk Television Plant, Krasnoyarsk Pulp and Paper Plant, Krasnoyarsk Combine Harvester Plant, a number of large defense enterprises in Biysk and Rubtsovsk in Altai, Rubtsovsk Tractor Plant, Altaiselmash and others.

Second, the crisis seriously hit the regional infrastructure. The construction of roads and engineering facilities almost stopped, Soviet roads and bridges began to decay, the railway freight turnover within the boundaries of the Siberian Federal District between 1990 and 2000 fell down by 1.72 times, within the boundaries of the Far Eastern Federal District — by 2.65 times, the number of passengers transported by air — by more than 4 times<sup>29</sup>.

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29 «Siberia and the Far East: Development and privatization» // URL: <http://east-eco.com/node/337>.

Third, mining was seriously diversified: only products for external markets appeared to be cost-effective, and, as a result, each year the share of exports in the overall mineral production was steadily growing. This actually resulted in backsliding of Siberia to the raw materials economy and a rapid recovery, in fact, of the colonial-raw materials development model. In general, 95 % of the Siberian exports today consists of products from three enlarged industries: fuel and energy commodities; metals and ores; and timber and products of primary wood processing<sup>30</sup>. With the increase of a purely raw materials specialization, investment and financial resources began to flow to certain growth points, while infrastructure and public utilities that previously were far from being perfect started to decay.

Only a small number of territories staking on forced raw material extraction were able to succeed under the new market conditions. Intensive development of oil and gas deposits in Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Areas, and the richest Norilsk complex ore deposit in the north of the Krasnoyarsk Territory turned these, once weak, regions into donors of the federal budget in the 1990s. At the same time, the southern regions of Siberia lacking significant raw material resources actually did not have such opportunities for growth and experienced a recession. A number of regions in South Siberia — the Altai Territory, Khakassia, Buryatia, Chita Region — found themselves in a difficult situation<sup>31</sup>. Altogether, Siberian territories by the level of their socio-economic development were set back by many years. According to the forecast prepared by scientists of the Novosibirsk Akademgorodok (Novosibirsk academic town) in 2001, even in the case of implementation of the federal programme under discussion, Siberia will be able to reach the 1989 economic performance

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30 «200 largest exporters of Siberia (2012)» // URL: <http://expertsib.ru/top-kompanij-sibiri/top-200-eksporteryi-sibiri/200-krupnejshix-eksporterov-sibiri-%282012-god%29>.

31 Victor V. Kistanov, Nicolay V. Kopylov, *Russia's regional economy*. // M.: Finances and statistics, 2006. 59 p.

only by 2022–2025<sup>32</sup>.

**The seventh cause** is a widespread “flow” of income from the operation of Siberian production facilities and resource exploitation into financial centres of the European part of the country under the “rental-raw materials” economic model during several post-reform years. According to L. Drachevsky, the Presidential Representative in the Siberian Federal District, today’s Siberia, while mining one third of minerals and providing Russia with 10 % of export earnings, directs over 80 % of raw materials rent to bank accounts of the capital financial and industrial groups<sup>33</sup>. The role of the Russian financial and industrial groups (Russian Aluminium, EvrazHolding, MDM Group, Severstal, MMG, Siberian-Urals Aluminium Company, etc.) in the Siberian socio-economic life is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, large capital and advanced management technologies came into the Siberian industry, the corporate holding structure was formed that meets the modern requirements, closes technological chains and increases the investment potential and competitive edge of products in the markets. However, the greatest problem is staying of almost all companies that hold control over the Siberian leading enterprises within their own bank structures and financial schemes outside the region. This situation can lead to outflow of funds from Siberia, increase complexity in the social sphere and weaken the integrity of economic space<sup>34</sup>. In this respect, the decision of “Gasprom”, a new owner of Sibneft refinery plant in Omsk, to re-register the company in Saint-Petersburg, thus depriving the region of a substantial tax revenue.

**The eighth cause** is chronic and hereditary poverty of a significant part of Siberians. According to academic Arkady Granberg, one of the major developers of the Policy Frame-

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32 Yuri Prokopiev, «In 25 years, Russia will return to the 1989 level» in *Kommersant-Sibir*, 2001. № 18. P. 1-4.

33 Yuri Trigubovich, «Gref’s department does not like Siberia» in *Nezavisimaya*, 2002. № 21. 4 p.

34 See: «Kuzbass economic potential» in *Kommersant-Sibir*, 2001. № 21. P. 10-11.

work for the development of Siberia until 2025, by the early 2000s out of all Siberian territories only Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Areas, the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Tyumen Region, Irkutsk Region and Tomsk Region had a higher standard of living than the Russian average. The Republic of Tyva and Agin-Buryat Autonomous Area, the poorest Siberian regions, occupy the lowest lines in the welfare rating of Russian regions<sup>35</sup>. But these are the extremes. In general, in the entire Siberian District the poverty level of 13 constituent entities is higher than the Russian average, about half of the District population lives below the poverty line. This predetermines a number of important characteristics of the socio-demographic situation in the Siberian region. The first characteristic relates to the fact that the natural increase of the Siberian population occurs through the poorest citizens. The second characteristic is that there is practically no “middle class” in the region because the threshold between the rich and the poor is blurred, the income of the “well-off” is close to the minimum subsistence level. Finally, the statistics shows the concentration of the extremely poor population in the Siberian District (the income is below the minimum subsistence level by 50 %). These, together, considerably reduce the prospects for the economic development in the region because poverty brings up poverty and it is unlikely that the socially impoverished will be willing to carry out reforms.

**The ninth cause** is the adverse balance of migration processes. Modern migration trends are quite worrying. The population of Siberia and the Far East of Russia declined by 2 mln people over the last 20 years due to internal migration to the western and central parts of the Russian Federation, and it is unlikely that this trend will change in coming years. This was firmly stated in the article “Migration in Russia: Western drift” written by N. V. Mkrtychyan, a researcher of the Institute of Demography of National Research University–Higher School

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35 Rustam Guseynov, «Siberia’s social sphere is still in depression yet» in Lyudi Dela XXI, 2001. № 6. P. 8-10.

of Economics<sup>36</sup>. The report claims that eastern districts of the country steadily lose the population, while western districts attract migrants. As a result, owing to migration, the metropolitan area steadily increases by 100–130 thousand people per year, and it is interregional migrants, rather than international migrants, who play a major role. And unlike in the previous decades, the country simply has no resources that could be directed to the “East”. To relocate to the regions of Siberia and the Far East, the expected salary should be 5–6 times higher than in the previous employment. It is evident that a totally different policy and strategy for the regional development is required for the eastern part of the country. Otherwise, the progressive decrease in the economically active and scarcely populated territory will turn into a large-scale threat to the territorial integrity of Russia.

Finally, **the tenth cause** is related to considerable risks for the operation of big businesses as the federal Centre lacks a well-designed and comprehensive strategy regarding Siberia and the Far East. Having invested significant funds into the production development during the boom years, private business will be facing more and more problems related to poor social and transport infrastructure, brain drain, overall socio-economic disadvantage of the Siberian territories. The specificity of location of large resources in the eastern regions of Russia is that they cannot be developed on a rotational basis without involving social costs. Dismantling of the single transport management and energy systems that actually occurred in the 1990–2000s adversely affects the operation of large companies, which significantly increases costs and risks for the companies operating here. It is obvious that it will not be possible to address these large-scale issues only within the frameworks of corporate strategies. Underdevelopment of territories behind the Urals reduces their investment attractiveness for busi-

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36 Nikita V. Mkrtchyan, «Migration in Russia: Western drift» in Newsletter No. 87 of Demography and Ecology Center of the Institute of National Economy Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, December 2004.

ness and reduces revenues from investments already made.

The effect of these factors was strong and stable. The relative socio-economic stabilization of the first half of the 2000s only partially weakened their impact, while the subsequent economic crises of 2008–2009 and 2014–2017 confirmed that unfavourable trends of the previous years continued.

A number of Siberian territories, taking advantage of the political and economic stabilization of the first half of the 2000s, managed to adapt to new conditions and achieve certain economic progress. As a result of nine months of 2006, industrial production growth in the Siberian Federal District exceeded the Russian average indicators (compared to the same period in 2005, it was 104.4 %, while in the Russian Federation it was 104.2 %). The increase in the industrial production index in most regions was achieved by the growth of raw materials industries. While in the whole country the volume of mining in January-September 2006 increased by 2.4 % compared to the same period, in the Siberian Federal District it increased by 4.4 %<sup>37</sup>. At the same time, budget and GRP, investment self-financing, energy saving with the reduction in staff numbers continued to grow.

Such a “raw materials growth” was observed in this period not only in Kuzbass, traditionally strong in this respect (the growth rate of coal production for the past year amounted to 106.7 %), but also in such traditionally non-resource regions as Novosibirsk Region (128.8 %) and Omsk Region (110 %). At the same time, the increase in the processing industry, even if it took place, lagged far behind the raw materials growth rate.

In the years of relative economic recovery in Russia, such factor as the inadequate development of the production structure of the Siberian regions and their dependence on the export of several types of products was still important. Since the early 2000s the authorities of almost all regions of the Siberian Federal District noted growing dependence on external markets,

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37 [http://www.akm.ru/rus/analyt/analyt\\_new\\_sb/report/samples/ng758.htm](http://www.akm.ru/rus/analyt/analyt_new_sb/report/samples/ng758.htm).

when any, even insignificant, fluctuations in the global coal and steel market lead to serious losses. At the same time, the latter still largely determines the level of workload of both basic industries associated with minerals extraction and primary processing and the related industries: engineering, chemistry, transport. During this period the situation in the processing industries remained strongly dependent on the state foreign economic policy, which was noted in 2006 by members of the Interregional Association of Enterprise Managers (IAEM). As they admitted, the main trend of the pre-crisis period preceding 2008–2009 was a gradual deterioration in the conditions for the access of industrial enterprises to foreign market while having general imbalance in the domestic market<sup>38</sup>.

The crisis that began in 2008 was the moment of truth for the regional management model that emerged in the 2000s, as well as for determining the long-term future of Siberia. It confirmed the predominantly market nature of economic successes of the Siberian and other Russian regions of the previous years, not supported by a well-designed strategy of the regional (and macro-regional) development.

First of all, the crisis led to a rapid decline of tax revenues of the regional budgets. The end of the “fat years” (2000–2008), when due to the overall high rates of economic growth and an active “redistributive” policy of the federal authorities the socio-economic gap between the “rich” and “poor” territories was relatively mitigated, revealed a well-known “efficiency threshold” of the “centralized distributive federalism” policy of recent years<sup>39</sup>. The territories the relative prosperity of which was traditionally based on the industrial potential found themselves in a more difficult situation. According to estimates of the Ministry of Regional Development, the 2008–2009 crisis was the hardest for industrialized regions of the Urals and Si-

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38 Olga Kolomeytseva, «Siberian region needs “second wind» in *Continent-Sibir*, 2006. № 42. 9 p.

39 Nicolay V. Petrov, «Russia-2009: Portrait against the background of the crisis» // URL: <http://www.carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=40489>.



beria, where during the crisis development there was a sharp decline in industrial output<sup>40</sup>. In general, industrial output in the country fell by 14.9 %, which significantly affected the social sphere of many Siberian territories.

Today, the situation in most Russian regions (as well as in many regions of Siberia) looks even more problematic. In the situation of sanctions imposed by Western countries in connection with the opposition on the “Ukrainian issue” and the reduction of budget revenues, the capabilities of the federal Centre to render assistance to distressed regions have significantly decreased. Meanwhile, the possibilities of the regions to address their problems independently turned out to be rather limited due to the transfer to the level of constituent entities of a significant part of funding of the social sphere from budgets of the federal constituent entities<sup>41</sup>. Taking 2008 as the starting point, then from 2014 the major social expenditures on education, health care, social protection have grown by more than 80 %. At the same time, all budgets of the constituent entities and expenditures on the national economy have increased by 40–45 %. A kind of breakdown in the regions occurred in 2012, when they were made to implement a number of so-called “social decrees”. As a result, a large-scale reduction in the social expenditures of the budget started from 2015, which may lead to a considerable growth of social tension because today twenty Russian regions are suffering a default<sup>42</sup>.

The author strongly believes that all these factors only lead to further impoverishment of Siberia, which will be accompanied by a decrease in the population (due to a decrease in the birth rate and migration to Central Russia), the destruction of the industrial, scientific and educational potential. However, nature abhors a vacuum, and such weakening of the region

40 Natalya V. Zubarevich, Russian regions: Inequality, crisis, modernization. // M., 2010. P. 60-61.

41 Igor Kalinovskiy, «Regions will have their bad time» // URL: <http://expert.ru/2015/03/5/regionyi-hlebnut-krizisa-spolna/>

42 «Natalia Zubarevich: Regions are in an extremely vulnerable situation» // URL: <http://www.otr-online.ru/programmi/natalya-zubarevich-mi-40179.html>.

will make it a subject of scrutiny on the part of neighbouring countries interested in possessing cheap crude hydrocarbons.

	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Process in Siberia</b>	<b>Comment</b>
1	Gross regional product	A steady trend is the decreasing economic importance of Siberia for Russia	A decline in the contribution of Siberia to the gross domestic product in the past 14 years has been 2.8 %, from 13.4 % in 1998 to 10.6 % in 2009.
2	Exports	A steady trend is the decreasing contribution of Siberia to Russian exports	A decline in the contribution of Siberia to Russian exports in the past 13 years has been 2.3 %, from 11.8 % in 1998 to 9.5 % in 2010
3	The population of Siberia	A slight decrease in the share of Siberians in the total population of Russia	The share of Siberians in the population of Russia in the past 20 years has decreased by 0.51 %, from 14.3 % in 1990 to 13.8 % in 2009. In the last three years, the population growth in Novosibirsk Region and Tomsk Region has been recorded
4	The index of physical volume of the gross regional product	The economic growth rate in Siberia in 1997–2008 was below the Russian average	The economic growth rate in Siberia lagged behind the Russian average by 2–6 %, approached this indicator in 2007–2008 and began to “outstrip” only in 2009 (crisis) year
5	Volume of investments	A decline in the share of investments in the Siberian economy in the total volume of investments in Russia	The share of Russian investments in the Siberian economy in the past 20 years has decreased by 1.5 times, from 14.8 % in 1990 to 9.7 % in 2010
6	Internal research and development costs	A decline in the share of funding for science in Siberia in the total volume of Russian expenditures for research and development	The share of funding for science in Siberia in the total volume of Russian expenditures for research and development in the past 15 years has decreased by 1.8 %, from 8.3 % in 1994 to 6.5 % in 2010. Similar cutbacks occurred in Novosibirsk Region, from 3.0 % in 1994 to 2.3 % in 2010 and in the Krasnoyarsk Territory — from 1.6 % in 1994 to 1.4 % in 2010.
7	Per capita income	A decline in per capita income in Siberia in comparison with the income of the average Russian resident	For 15 years, there has been a decline in the income of Siberians in comparison with the incomes of the average Russian resident: in 1995, incomes of residents in the Siberian Federal District were lower than the Russian average by 4.3 %, and in 2010 — lower by 20 %

8	The share of the population with incomes below the minimum subsistence level	The share of the poor in Siberia proves to be higher than the Russian average indicators, while the overall trend of the declining share of the poor in Russia and Siberia is observed	For 15 years, there has been a decline in the share of the poor in Russia and Siberia. But the share of the poor in Siberia has always been higher than the Russian average indicators: in 2000 the poverty level in Siberia was 41.6 %, in Russia — 29.0 %; in 2005 in Siberia — 21.6 %, in Russia — 17.7 %; in 2010 in Siberia — 17.7%, in Russia — 12.6 %. In 2010, the share of the poor in Siberia was 1.40 times higher than the share of the poor in Russia.
9	Mortality for social reasons (suicide, alcohol poisoning)	A rise in mortality of Siberians for social reasons in comparison with the Russian average indicators	The situation of a social catastrophe. For 20 years in Siberia there has been a rise in mortality due to social reasons, in 1990 it exceeded the Russian average indicators by 18 %, with an excess of 60 % in 2010
10	The share of the population with higher education among employed in the economy	In Siberia, there is a low share of people with higher education employed in the economy, it is lower than the Russian average	The share of people with higher education employed in the economy in Siberia in the past 18 years has been 90 % of the Russian average. There is a small decline in the level of education in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Novosibirsk Region and a sharp drop in the level of education in Tomsk Region — from 120–130 % of the Russian average values in 1990–1994 to 96–105 % in 2008–2009.
11	The crime rate is the number of crimes per 10 thousand of the population	In Siberia, the crime rate is higher than the Russian average	The crime rate in Siberia in the past 20 years has been 15–30% higher than the Russian average indicators. And in 2006–2010, there was an increase in the crime rate excess over the Russian average values from 15 % to 30 %. The greatest growth was recorded in Tomsk Region
12	The level of “heavy” crimes is the number of crimes per 10 thousand of the population.	The growth of the “heavy” crimes in Siberia in comparison with the Russian average values	In the past 10 years, the level of “heavy” crimes in Siberia has been higher than the Russian average values by 30–60 %. At the same time in 2006–2010, there was an increase in the level of “heavy” crimes compared to the Russian average values: in the Siberian Federal District — from 34.1 % to 59.0 %; in the Krasnoyarsk Territory — from 17.7 % to 41.9 %; in Novosibirsk Region — from 9.5 % to 26.5 %, in Tomsk Region — from (-) 15.4 % to 30.1 %

The source used: Valery S. Efimov, Alexandr V. Efimov, «Siberia in modern Russia» in [http://foresight.sfu-kras.ru/sites/foresight.sfu-kras.ru/files/Statya\\_Sibir\\_v\\_sovremennoy\\_Rossii.pdf](http://foresight.sfu-kras.ru/sites/foresight.sfu-kras.ru/files/Statya_Sibir_v_sovremennoy_Rossii.pdf).

At the same time, sustaining the Siberian region, its well-being and stability is certainly in the interests of Russia. However, as the above analysis shows, this problem cannot be solved within the framework of a “liberal-monetary” or a “colonial-raw materials” strategy. Solutions of a lobbying-corporatist type also do not contribute towards this objective, as the experience of the formation and practices of the State Corporation for the Development of Siberia and the Far East established in the mid-2000s has shown. The mentioned experiment, in particular, demonstrated that providing such significant and unilateral benefits to the financial and industrial groups participating in the project (preferential taxation, access to regional communications, removal **from the jurisdiction of both regional and federal authorities**, etc., land plots and licenses for minerals development, etc.) does not ensure the integrated development of their constituent territories and the solution of their accumulated problems. In this case, we can state the creation of a power-management structure, which initially found it difficult to reflect the diversity of characteristic features of the socio-economic development of the macro-region and to adapt business projects to the conditions of specific territories.

It is to be reminded that the initial plans of the State Corporation for the Development of Siberia and the Far East assumed that the latter would actively invest in the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the bridge to Sakhalin and ensure the “restoration of positions” on the shores of the Arctic Ocean. It also included the issue of the tunnel under the Bering Strait. About USD 150–200 billion, according to various estimates, would be required for the implementation of the main transport projects alone mentioned in the Strategy for the development of Siberia and the Far East — that is, more than in aggregate was spent on the construction of housing behind the Urals during all post-Soviet years<sup>43</sup>. This last cir-

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43 Vladislav Inozemtsev, Valery Zubov, «Siberia Corporation: How to develop country's eastern regions?» in Arguments and Facts. 2013. 5 May.

cumstance initially called into question the feasibility of the claimed plans, while the decrease of the federal budget, due to the 2014 crisis, drew a line under some of these projects. The proposed basic model for the development of the Siberian and Far Eastern macro-regions — the “opening of the storehouse” of natural resources and performance of an effective “industrial maneuver” through private and public investments aimed at increasing domestic consumption and supplying products to fast growing Asian-Pacific markets — turned out to be unrealistic, since it did not take into account a possible change in the external economic conditions<sup>44</sup>.

The relative failure of the mega-project showed that today company’s activities need to be supplemented by the implementation of long-term regional development programmes with the participation of regional authorities, regional business, the entire system of interregional horizontal ties that were developed by interregional economic cooperation associations in the 1990s.

An alternative to this is evidently megalomania and all the costs of unilateral lobbying described above. It also confirmed that the lack of clear goals of the state regional policy does not help the state determine the strategic priorities of the regional development, reduces the effectiveness of interregional forecasts, policy frameworks and programmes of socio-economic development of the regions.

## **WHAT IS TO BE DONE? (INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION)**

What strategic advantages can Siberia use in the current context in addition to its rich natural resources and still available “human capital”?

Among the resources of the macro-region conducive to its transition to an innovative development model are:

1. Favourable geographic position and high logistics potential that makes Siberia a natural transport bridge between the countries of the Asia-Pacific region (APR) and Europe. It is

<sup>44</sup> Olga Bukharova, «Eastern Corporation will take up a macro-region» in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 2012, 22 March.

through Siberia that the shortest delivery of goods and passengers passes. It appears necessary to implement projects of reconstruction and development of the Trans-Siberian Railway, construction of a number of additional motorways, reconstruction and development of seaports. Favourable factors of growth are the Northern Sea Route, the “river-sea” navigation corridors, auto- and air transportation, including to China and the Asia-Pacific countries. The most important role in the development of the Siberian transport system belongs to the development and formation of transport hubs that ensure the interaction of all modes of transport and the coordination of transportation in different directions. Novosibirsk, Omsk, Krasnoyarsk or Irkutsk, where both railroads, motorways, and possible routes and river routes intersect, can become such transport centres capable of fulfilling the role of multimodal transport hubs.

As of today, the most promising is the project featuring the creation of the Novosibirsk multimodal hub, which has already begun to be implemented. Due to its geographical location, the presence of a highly developed complex of aviation, railway, road, water and pipeline transport, Novosibirsk Region is a unique transport link between the West and the East.

2. Secondly, still available industrial potential of Siberia. According to experts, the growth potential of Siberia in the fuel and energy complex, non-ferrous and ferrous metallurgy and food industry is especially high. A rapid growth in chemical and petrochemical, timber and wood processing industries is also possible. The significant in the past, yet lost in recent years, potential of engineering and construction complexes can be relatively quickly restored and surpassed in case of the growing economy.

3. Thirdly, the scientific and technical, and research and educational capacities of Siberia are an important factor for long-term and sustainable growth. In Siberia, there are over 100 institutes and research centers of the Siberian Branch of the

Russian Academy of Sciences, many of which are the leading institutions in the most important areas of cutting-edge equipment and technology. Wide-scale implementation of Siberian scientific and technical developments will allow to reduce the material and energy intensity of production, increase the labour productivity several times. The educational complex with a certain reorientation is able to meet the needs of the developing economy in highly qualified personnel.

4. Experience in forward planning at the level of the Siberian Federal District and its individual territorial entities. The discussion of strategic development programmes for 2020–2030 was held in most territories and regions of the Siberian Federal District in the mid-2000s. Particularly noteworthy is the integrated approach used by the authors of all programme developments presented to the public. A long-term development plan for ten years, a medium-term plan for five years, as well as current annual plans complement the regional strategy for each of the Siberian regions. In addition to Novosibirsk Region, the Krasnoyarsk and Altai Territories, Tomsk and Kemerovo Regions also have similar integrated plans. Thus, in particular, the key direction for the development of the Krasnoyarsk Territory was the transition to the development of processing industries such as oil and gas chemistry, timber processing. The strategic programme for the development of the Territory was elaborated on the basis of a cluster analysis, where timber, agro-industrial, construction and transport clusters were identified as the most promising ones, with intersectoral coordination based on the system industries, including energy and railway transport, as their core principle. The development strategy of the Altai Territory is based on the active development of small businesses and small enterprises, since this sector employs 308,600 people, or 28 % of the total number of people employed in the economy of the region (in Russia – 20 %), which contribute to budgets of all levels up to 20 % per year. The Tomsk Regional Administra-

tion, bearing in mind the situation of the last 20 years, when the highest growth rates were forecast in high-tech sectors (information and communications technologies, biotechnology, nanotechnology), and having a developed research and educational complex, high-quality human capital and rich natural resources, counts on the following areas:

- information technologies, biotechnology, research and educational complex, “new economy”, electrical engineering and instrumentation;
- oil and gas, nuclear sectors;
- timber processing complex and agriculture.

At the same time, it is necessary to coordinate the efforts of the constituent entities of the Siberian Federal District at the district level within the framework of a more general development strategy. Of the practical measures necessary for the transition to a constructive strategy for the development of Siberia, the best example is the implementation of the policy framework for the development of Siberia which was elaborated on the initiative of the President of Russia with the active participation of the presidential representative office in the Siberian Federal District, scientists of the Siberian Branch of the RAS and business circles of the region in 2001–2002. The programme envisaged the transition from a raw materials to a high-tech structure of the Siberian economy, with the priority development of “haulage” industries (mineral and raw materials complex, software products, laser, electron beam, catalytic and other high-tech industries), the creation of technoparks (Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk), the development of communications (completion of the Baikal-Amur Mainline and modernization of the Trans-Siberian Railway), getting high-end world class science products in the world and domestic markets.

Unfortunately, the strategy for the development of Siberia, elaborated by scientists, politicians and businessmen has encountered rejection on the part of a number of prominent Rus-



sian political leaders who saw it as an “unaffordable luxury”. As a result, after long discussions in 2003, the Russian government approved the Strategy for the Development of Siberia. Having passed numerous stages of coordination in federal ministries, the strategy remained, in fact, a declarative document. It is believed that the strategy should be included as an integral part of the future programme for the development of Siberia<sup>45</sup>, but there is no firm assurance of its implementation in the foreseeable future.

In addition, attention should be drawn to the integrated strategy for the development of the Siberian region which was proposed for the regions of Western Siberia by Novosibirsk scientists from the Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences as far back as 2006. A 20-year period considered within the framework of the this strategy is divided into two decades. If there is an understanding of the structure of the economy in the first decade, the second is a kind of a “zone of uncertainty”. At the same time, when planning the development of various branches of the Siberian economy, as strategy designers believe, one should bear in mind the increasing role of intraregional strategies. The territories of the West Siberian region are expected to develop, in particular:

- energy (there are especially good opportunities for this in Kemerovo Region and the Krasnoyarsk Territory);
- special zones (economic, tourist, etc.), sites included in the list of federal resources;
- projects of innovation centres (Novosibirsk and Tomsk Regions, the Krasnoyarsk Territory have relevant ambitions)<sup>46</sup>.

The strategy implies the development not only of regions, but also of the branches of the economy such as energy, engineering, forestry and agricultural complexes, transport. The reasonable regional development policy is intended to estab-

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45 Anatoly Kvashnin A., «Live for today means survive» in *Continent-Sibir*, 2001. № 18. P. 1-4.

46 Yulia Vladykina. «The region needs resources» in *Continent-Sibir*, 2006. № 45. 3 p.

lish a balance between sectors, complexes and regions.

In addition to the activation of the main “growth points” and the use of long-term development programmes, the Siberian regions have other factors of self-development. Additional resources can also be found through modernization of enterprises, establishment of financial and organizational order.

We certainly need a state approach and a new quality of management decisions to be able to implement the large-scale projects under discussion. The implementation of large investment projects in the Siberian regions strongly demands to improve the quality of management in the regions of the district. The use of the regional internal reserves in the economy, in the public sector, as well as coordination with federal structures and large investors may increase the social and investment attractiveness of the Siberian territories. It is important to synchronize the efforts of federal ministries and departments, regions, private investors in implementing major investment projects in Siberia, as they open up major prospects for the regional development, create infrastructure conditions for the formation of entrepreneurial activity and production, which is especially important for remote territories. It is obvious that the transition of the economy to an innovative development path in Siberia is impossible without federal support, since the region does not have the sufficient solvent demand for innovation from entrepreneurs, the solvent demand of the population is low and the capabilities of the authorities of most territories to stimulate economic growth are limited.

The revision of the existing attitude towards Siberia and the transition to an intensive and balanced strategy for the development and use of the whole range of its resources (including demographic, social and human) can have a number of positive political effects, namely:

- Reduce bureaucratic centralization and the unilateral nature of reallocation of resources in favour of the European and,

above all, the Moscow “metropolis”;

- Initiate processes of better reintegration of Siberia and the Far East into the all-Russian political and economic space in order to reduce the threats of the transfer of these territories under control of geopolitical competitors;

- Provide broader opportunities for Russia’s geopolitical maneuver in the system of relations among the world’s major “centres of power”: USA, China (together with the APR countries) and the European Union.

In order to consolidate economic macro-regions (“big regions”) in Russia, the author considers it necessary:

1. To reinvigorate interregional economic cooperation associations coordinating this process at the level of federal districts;

2. To clarify and expand the powers of the federal districts through the adoption of special federal legislation;

3. To create specialized agencies for the relevant macro-regions at the federal level (for example, the Federal Agency for Siberia’s Affairs);

4. To undertake a comprehensive audit of the capabilities of regions and local governments within the federal districts;

5. To stimulate the process of developing long-term macro-regional programmes (strategies) for socio-economic development, taking into account already available programs of developments;

6. To use practices of public-private partnership for the implementation of long-term sectoral, infrastructural, social and other types of programmes at the level of federal districts and individual regions.

Thus, the strategy for the development of Siberia which stimulates the creation of strategic plans for individual regions and which is designed to increase the economic independence of the territory should facilitate the return to the territory of Russia of decision-making centres, as well as the main “levers” for social and economic development. Such

support and gradual “cultivation” of regional initiatives in the field of socio-economic development gives hope to the opportunity to complement Russia’s regional policy by consolidation of efforts at local levels instead of “modified centralization”.

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**UNESCO: culture  
and national traditions**

**ЮНЕСКО: культура  
и национальные традиции**

## Памятники истории и архитектуры федерального значения

### *Полный отчет об итогах проверки работы системы охраны памятников истории и архитектуры федерального значения*

Счетная палата России опубликовала (в 6-м, июньском выпуске своего «Бюллетеня») полный отчет об итогах проверки работы системы охраны памятников истории и архитектуры федерального значения.

Система оказалась устроена так, что оценить ее эффективность невозможно.

Константин Михайлов, главный редактор сайта «Хранители наследия» Смещение французского с нижегородским.

В 2008–2009 годах внедрили так называемую французскую систему охраны лучших (федерального значения) памятников национального наследия (о чем мы писали в «Огоньке» № 15 за 2009 год). Решили, что их (за исключением особого списка, оставшегося в ведении тогда Росохранкультуры, ныне Минкультуры РФ) будут охранять региональные органы власти. А чтобы эти «переданные полномочия» было на что и кем охранять, федеральный центр будет ежегодно переводить регионам денежные субвенции.

### **В каком состоянии находятся российские памятники**

Собственно, ими Счетная палата и занималась. Официальное название ее «контрольного мероприятия» — «Проверка обоснованности объемов субвенций и их

распределения на осуществление переданных Российской Федерацией полномочий по государственной охране объектов культурного наследия, предоставленных в 2015–2018 годах из федерального бюджета бюджетам субъектов Российской Федерации».

Проверяли систему по поручению Владимира Путина: на заседании президентского Совета по культуре и искусству в 2018 году вспомнили, что «французской» системе исполняется 10 лет и неплохо бы оценить достижения. Проверка шла с декабря 2018 по март 2019 года.

Как и у Грибоедова, «смешение французского с нижегородским» вышло весьма причудливым. Когда задумывали реформу, считалось, что охранять и контролировать десятки тысяч федеральных памятников из Москвы — утопия. Это логично, но не менее логично то, что охранять их «с земли», не имея для того сил и средств, одними голыми «полномочиями» — утопия не меньшая.

Ее-то мы упорно и пытаемся воплотить в жизнь.

### **Статистика не сходится**

Первым делом, конечно, федеральные памятники нужно посчитать — от их количества в каждом регионе, понятное дело, зависит и размер субвенций, и штатный состав сотрудников, занятых в охране памятников. Казалось бы, что тут сложного — есть реестры и охранные списки, но не тут-то было.

По данным Минкультуры, которыми оперирует Счетная палата, на конец декабря 2018 года в Едином государственном реестре объектов культурного наследия (памятников истории и культуры) России числится 144 411 объектов. Из них федерального значения — 69 299 (54 233 памятника, 14 897 ансамблей, 169 достопримечательных мест).

Есть и печальные подробности: в неудовлетворительном состоянии 35 процентов, или более 24 тысяч объектов

федерального значения, в том числе около 5 тысяч в аварийном состоянии, а 879 прямо-таки в руинах.

Это дает, казалось бы, хотя бы точную картину для стратегии спасения наследия, но насколько она точна?

По данным Росстата, которыми тоже оперирует Счетная палата, памятников в Едином госреестре гораздо меньше — 98 662, из которых федерального значения — 20 137. Счетная палата указывает, что «данные Минкультуры на 45,8 процента больше показателей федерального статистического наблюдения» и «указанный факт свидетельствует о недостоверности статистических данных в части состава объектов культурного наследия».

Где потерялись десятки тысяч памятников? Такое расхождение — не шутка. Спокойствие: даже при беглом изучении вопроса выясняется, что Росстат (в изложении Счетной палаты) отдельно сосчитал еще 59 431 объект археологического наследия, а к общему числу не приплюсовал. Добавить археологию — цифры более или менее сходятся с министерскими.

### **Это здорово, но как субвенции-то считать?**

Мало того, федеральные цифры объектов, госохрану которых надо финансировать из центра, в разы отличаются от региональных. Счетная палата пишет в отчете: «По состоянию на 1 июля 2017 года субъектами РФ осуществлялись полномочия по сохранности и контролю за состоянием 59 914 ОКН (объектов культурного наследия. — К.М.) федерального значения, включая объекты археологии. Однако Минкультуры России расчет объема субвенции на ОКН осуществляло исходя из 18 166 ОКН федерального значения, что в 3,3 раза меньше».

Результат: объем субвенций Нижегородской области на 2016–2018 годы рассчитывался исходя из 234 федеральных памятников, хотя в 2015 году число таковых в регионе составляло 946, в 2016 году — 1119, в 2017 и 2018 годах



— 1260. Получается, в реальности только одному региону для исполнения «переданных полномочий» требовалось чуть ли не вшестеро больше людей и денег.

В общем, неудивительно, что Счетная палата делает вывод об «искажении расчета объема субвенции».

### **А сколько дали?**

Но раз уж процесс госохраны памятников не остановить, субвенции ежегодно выделяются регионам. Сколько дали?

По данным Счетной палаты, в 2015–2018 годах денег на госохрану федеральных памятников регионам выделяли не так уж много. В 2015 году — 322,1 млн рублей, в 2016-м — 289,9, в 2017-м — 307,0, в 2018-м — 308,7 млн. Всего 1 млрд 227 млн 698,2 тысячи рублей за четыре года. Регионы массово жаловались на недофинансирование: в 2015–2016 годах таковых было 20, в 2017-м — 23. Всего, отмечает Счетная палата, регионам недодали в 2016 году — 32 млн 231,1 тысячи рублей, в 2017 году — 15 млн 841,7 тысячи рублей. Наиболее пострадавшие — Псковская область, Санкт-Петербург, Курская и Смоленская области.

### **К чему может привести либерализация системы охраны памятников**

Сумму субвенций регионам определяли на основании специальной «Методики № 1183», однако Счетная палата уверена, что «используемый подход не позволял определить и достоверно обосновать объем потребности в финансовом обеспечении». Например, субвенцию высчитывали без учета памятников археологии, «которые составляют более 70 процентов общего количества ОКН». А что, разве археологию охранять не надо?

В 2018 году федеральное правительство исправило и дополнило методику, в результате чего общий объем субвенций регионам на 2019 год и на плановый период

2020–2021 годов по сравнению с 2018 годом вырос аж на 90 процентов (на 2019 год — 585 млн 751,4 тысячи рублей).

Однако всех проблем это не решило. Идеальные цифры методики бывают очень далеки от реалий. Например, субвенцию Комитету по охране объектов культурного наследия Ростовской области на 2019 год рассчитывали для штатной численности, необходимой для госохраны 8234 памятников федерального значения в регионе — «74,8 единицы». А в реальном штате ростовского комитета — всего-то 12 человек. В Комитете по государственному контролю, использованию и охране памятников истории и культуры Санкт-Петербурга в 2016 году реальный штат сотрудников, которые должны надзирать за федеральными памятниками — был 48 человек, а субвенцию ему рассчитывали исходя из «99 единиц». В Москве это соотношение получше — 60 и 69. В общем, работают «за себя и за того парня».

### **Забыли про надзор**

Не удивительно, что за всеми зайцами и погнаться не успевают. Например, согласно отчету Счетной палаты, штат сотрудников региональных госорганов, на который выделяются субвенции, определяется в том числе «исходя из количества плановых мероприятий по контролю за состоянием одного объекта культурного наследия федерального значения». Однако проверка показала, что, скажем, в 2016 году никаких плановых мероприятий по этому контролю не было в девяти регионах, в 2017-м — в шести, в 2018-м — в трех. А деньги-то федеральные были выделены.

Но это еще полбеды: выяснилось, что при расчете субвенций и в 2015–2018 годах, и на 2019 год вообще не учитывались мероприятия по федеральному государственному надзору за состоянием, содержанием,

сохранением, использованием, популяризацией и государственной охраной памятников федерального значения. А это ведь важнейшее «федеральное полномочие», переданное региональным властям. Но финансированием, выходит, не подкрепленное.

В результате оказалось, что в 2015–2018 годах надзорные мероприятия на федеральных памятниках проводили только в 36 процентах регионов России (в 2016 году — в 28 регионах, в 2017-м — в 26, в 2018-м — в 36).

Как, интересно, федеральный центр должен спрашивать с регионов за надзор за федеральными памятниками, если он его не финансирует?

### **«Отсутствует порядок оценки»**

Но еще интереснее тот факт, что, согласно выводам Счетной палаты, эффективность работы региональных властей по госохране федеральных памятников вообще не поддается объективной оценке.

Как пишут аудиторы СП, отсутствует и порядок оценки этой эффективности, и какая-либо методика оценки качества осуществления переданных полномочий — ни показателей, ни формул расчета. «Минкультуры России при распределении субвенции на 2014–2015 годы целевой показатель эффективности не устанавливался», — констатирует Счетная палата. С 2016 года Минкультуры РФ ввело-таки целевой показатель эффективности: региональные органы госохраны памятников обязаны ежегодно проконтролировать сохранность не менее 20 процентов федеральных памятников на своей территории. Но этот один-единственный показатель, как справедливо замечает Счетная палата, «не охватывает полноту деятельности органа исполнительной власти... что не позволяет провести оценку ее эффективности».

А большего с региональных госорганов, оказывается, и не спрашивают: в отчетах, которые они должны подавать

в Москву, «отсутствуют показатели о состоянии объектов культурного наследия, что не позволяет объективно определить уровень рисков утраты памятников для своевременного принятия мер по их сохранению».

Получается, что от регионов требуют контролировать состояние федеральных памятников, но результатами этого контроля даже не интересуются.

Если во Франции прочитают отчет Счетной палаты, то, должно быть, весьма удивятся такому воплощению в жизнь принципов «французской» системы охраны культурного наследия.

### **Неутешительные выводы**

Здесь можно даже не комментировать, а просто цитировать выводы, сделанные Счетной палатой по итогам проверки.

«Действующая система учета и контроля за состоянием объектов культурного наследия федерального значения не позволяет оценить эффективность осуществления переданных региональным органам власти полномочий в сфере их охраны».

### **Почему памятники культуры невозможно защитить без вмешательства первых лиц**

«Проведенный анализ источников данных, использованных Минкультуры России, показал, что объем субвенции на финансовое обеспечение переданных полномочий субъекту Российской Федерации на 2015–2018 годы не обоснован, так как используемые данные не соответствовали фактическим».

«Отсутствие прозрачного механизма финансового обеспечения переданных полномочий, ненадлежащий контроль (его отсутствие) со стороны органов исполнительной власти субъектов Российской Федерации за использованием ОКН и, как следствие, допущение их

физической утраты или утраты исторической? значимости...»

Счетная палата намерена направить соответствующий доклад президенту страны.

И здесь надо заметить, что круг замкнулся.

Ведь президент давал поручение об этой проверке именно затем, чтобы оценить эффективность нынешней системы госохраны исторических памятников федерального значения.

И теперь ему доложат, что оценить эффективность невозможно.

Кто бы мог подумать, что именно система охраны памятников окажется таким «черным ящиком»?

P.S. Минкультуры со своей стороны начало проверку того, как в регионах исполняют переданные им федеральные полномочия по охране памятников. «Огонек» надеется в будущем ознакомить читателей с результатами этой проверки.

*Social projects  
and information technologies*

*Социальные проекты  
и информационные технологии*

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**Educational autonomy of students**

**Abstract.** The authors of the article consider topical issues of students' preparation for classes, planning and organization of independent work of a student in the process of education and performance of research works made by students, preparing them for independent solution of professional tasks.

**Key words:** modern communicative and educational needs, autonomous activity of the student, educational autonomy, individualization of education, information, computer, remote, practice-oriented, scientific and methodical technologies.

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**Образовательная автономность студентов**

**Аннотация.** Авторами статьи рассматриваются актуальные вопросы подготовки студентов к занятиям, планирования и организации самостоятельной работы студента в процессе обучения и выполнения студентами научно-исследовательских и учебно-исследовательских работ, готовящих их к самостоятельному решению профессиональных задач.

**Ключевые слова:** современные коммуникативные и образовательные потребности, автономная деятельность студента, образовательная автономия, индивидуализация обучения, информационные, компьютерные, дистанционные, практико-ориентированные, научно-методические технологии.



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## **Educational autonomy of students\***

Continuous, supervised and regulated teaching of a foreign language under the guidance of a teacher cannot satisfy the modern communicative and educational needs of a developing and active individual in society. Properly planned and organized independent work of the student in the process of learning, support and supervision by the teacher are important components of successful learning of a foreign language at the university. Communication in the classroom and autonomous activity of a student in the course of preparation for classes or dialogue and monologue speech are constantly interchanged in the classroom and during homework. All types of speech activities require training in language and speech skills. And it is necessary to train them not only in the classroom, but also independently. In modern interpretation, the term “independent seatwork” often sounds like “educational autonomy”. Creating conditions for the development of personal autonomy in the educational space is the main task of a foreign language teacher at a university.

H. Holek was the first to define educational autonomy as a

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process of setting goals, defining content, choosing methods and techniques to manage this process [3].

Solovova E.N. understands personal autonomy as a student's ability to independently manage the process of his or her learning and bear responsibility for planning, process and result of his or her activity [4].

E.A. Taranchuk considers educational autonomy as a personal quality of a student, which is implemented in a socio-political context, taking into account the organizational and methodological side for the organization of learning [2].

L. Mariani defines the term "autonomy" as "an essential need of each person, his aspiration for independence, responsibility and independent decision-making of vital importance" [3, p. 68].

The concept of autonomy in many cases is defined through the independence and independence of the learner, which is similar to the traditional and widely used concepts in the scientific literature "individualization of learning" and "independence in learning".

The key factor in the development of the student autonomy and achievement of an appropriate level of professional competence development is independent work, independent access to educational and scientific resources and technologies of self-education.

Thus, the students' educational autonomy can be characterized by the high quality of their independent work and is one of the tasks of individualization of learning. Independent work of students is a means of individualization of their learning and at the same time the reason and consequence of the formation of the educational autonomy.

It is natural that the organization of autonomous learning requires the basic conditions, firstly - the willingness and desire of students and their ability to act in accordance with their own goals and motivations. Second, quality methodological support, which is an integral component of the ed-

educational process, ensuring its adaptability, purposefulness and efficiency.

Student's readiness for educational autonomy is a phenomenon that is individual in nature and depends on the peculiarities of personal development. For some students, this stage is already in the first year, when they are engaged in scientific activities in addition to their studies. Others, on the other hand, are ready for the third year of study when they have the skills to perform coursework and other reporting work according to the program requirements.

As for methodological support, the basic methodological support in modern universities is the Teaching and Methodological Complex of the Discipline, which contains revised curricula and programs with an increased share of independent work of students, including the use of information, computer, remote, practice-oriented, scientific and methodical technologies. At the same time, it is necessary to focus on the students' performance of research and educational-research works, which prepare them for independent solution of professional tasks (through writing abstracts, course papers, diploma papers, etc.).

The structure of Teaching and Methodological Complex of the Discipline (TMCD) includes practical tasks of different levels (teaching, training, search and creative) for independent preparation of the students for classes.

Search and creative tasks are widely used when learning a foreign language. For example, project activity allows the student to work independently and at the same time it has an individual character. Working on the project, the student trains all types of speech activity. Audio texts, authentic reference material in a foreign language, written and computerized recording of selected and presented material, oral storytelling, answers to the questions, explanation and clarification contribute to the effective development of skills and abilities of oral speech through project activities.

The effectiveness of the students' autonomy development depends on the degree of realization of individual approach, which regulates the use of multilevel tasks, different ways to achieve the goals of learning the educational material, the variety of structuring of theoretical material taking into account different motives for the study of the discipline. Implementation of the individual approach is possible through a special design of didactic material, types of educational dialogue, forms of control. When organizing the autonomy of the students, special attention should be paid to the development of critical research thinking within the framework of innovative approaches to the development of methodological aids for the organization of independent work of the students.

Since at present the autonomy is considered as a necessary condition for continuous education and a factor of intensification of the students' educational activity, teachers should start to create conditions favorable for autonomous mastering of educational subjects, including foreign languages, as early as possible. These conditions can be ensured by using different methods and technologies.

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**«Recalling future»: mythological sense-building for XXI century**

**Abstract.** Mythological sensebuilding is appreciated here as a smart mindbuilding technology, aimed at world culture renewal, which is urgent for human survival. The image of Daedalus, the famous mythical engineer and aeronaut, is argued to be an ideal pattern of a daring and creative human being, while Ancient Greek culture is treated as a source of basic existential senses. The latter are comprehended as a possible foundation for a universal goal myth, vital for planetary future.

**Key words:** myth, mythology, goal myth, sensebuilding, mythological sensebuilding, culture, Alton Wiener, «Magnificent Myth», Milana Aldarova, «Daedalus. Oratorio».

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**«Воспоминание о будущем»: мифологическое смыслообразование для XXI века**

**Аннотация.** В статье рассматривается феномен мифологического смыслообразования как способ концентрации созидательной энергии человечества для преодоления кризиса современной цивилизации. Автор исследует образ мифического мастера и аэронавта Дедала, реконструированный поэтом и философом Миланой Алдаровой, в качестве идеала человека-творца, а культуру античности – в качестве источника базовых бытийных смыслов, способных послужить основой нового универсального целеполагающего мифа.

**Ключевые слова:** миф, мифология, целевой миф, смыслообразование, мифологическое смыслообразование, культура, Элтон Винер, «Величественный Миф», Милана Алдарова, «Дедал. Оратория».

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## **«Recalling future»: mythological sense-building for XXI century\***

Это должен быть воистину Величественный Миф –  
воспламеняющий, возвышающий, возвращающий  
смысл человеческой жизни.

*Элтон Винер (Пер. с англ.)*

Самое время вспомнить о нём, о великом Дедале.

*Милана Алдарова*

Более сорока лет назад в США вышла книга профессора Мичиганского университета Элтона Винера «Величественный миф: модели социального контроля в постиндустриальном обществе»<sup>1</sup>. Книга сразу же приобрела международную известность, а её автор – славу «первопроходца», впервые объявившего о принципиальной «провальности» управления массовым сознанием при помощи традиционных идеологических парадигм. В основе «дерзкого» вывода лежало «открытие» несоответствия «американской мечты» о личной свободе и

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**«Воспоминание о будущем»: мифологическое смыслообразование для XXI века**

1 A. Wiener Magnificent Myth: Patterns of Control In Post-Industrial Society. – N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1978. 413 p. В российский научный обиход книга вошла под названием «Великолепный миф», что не совсем точно, поскольку английское слово «magnificent» означает не великолепие, а величие, мощь, внушительность.

жизненном успехе природе человека: Винер напомнил «городу и миру», что *homo sapiens* – не производственно-потребительский механизм, что он призван «летать выше», что ни успешные трудяги-обыватели, ни философствующие хипстеры не способны сделать свою страну притягательным примером для других народов. Эта страна может стать мировым политическим лидером, но при этом вызывать всеобщее духовное отторжение; она может обеспечить себе высокий уровень экономического развития, но не «произвести» ни одной идеи, способной сплотить и воодушевить народ.

По сути дела всё это было лишь концентрированным выражением западной «философии бунта» 1960-1970-х годов: к моменту публикации «Величественного мифа» тысячи молодых американцев, последователей Карлоса Кастанеды и индо-буддистских мистиков, уже успели переселиться в Индию и Латинскую Америку, а Боб Дилан – пропеть свои песни о «людях, которые завоёвывают мир, но теряют души». Винер лишь подвёл печальный итог. Новым в его книге был призыв к серьёзной содержательной переориентации западной пропаганды на «высокое» и «духовное»: с идей – на идеалы, с временного – на вечное. Источником универсальных смыслов в постиндустриальном обществе Винер провозгласил великие мифы прошлого, а главным механизмом смыслообразования в общественном сознании – его мифологизацию.

Вторая часть названия книги («модели социального контроля») свидетельствует о том, что озабоченность «возвышенным» в данном случае имела вполне прагматическую основу. В то время уже были опубликованы первые доклады Римскому клубу, где исчерпанность экономического потенциала «денежной цивилизации» (термин В.Ю. Катасонова) была продемонстрирована при помощи точных наук. Винер напомнил об исчерпанности потенциала духовного – об угасании в молодых поколениях «духа

Фронттира»<sup>2</sup>, и указал на необходимость создания нового целеполагающего мифа (goal myth) в качестве первейшего условия духовного сплочения и возвышения нации. Величия духа требует величия мифа: по мнению американского учёного, этот миф должен был быть возвышенным, притягательным, универсальным, сверхличностным, устремлённым в будущее. Судя по греческим названиям глав книги – *Hubris* (гордыня), *Arete* (добродетель) и т. д., одним из источников вдохновения автору служили мифологемы древней Эллады, однако они не стимулировали попытки переосмысления изначального духовного опыта человечества в контексте современных реальностей. Вместе с юнговскими архетипами эти мифологемы стали лишь основой для создания нового национального мифа – мифа о народе-герое, готовом и способном сразиться с мировым злом, прийти на помощь человечеству.

Сотворением «Величественного Мифа» занялся Голливуд – на безлимитной финансовой основе и высоком профессиональном уровне. В поставленных на поток фильмах и телесериалах доблестные, благородные американцы – представители разных полов, рас и этносов – спасали род людской от террористов, инопланетян и стихийных бедствий. Однако величие этого мастерски изготовленного героического мифа вступало (и продолжает вступать) в противоречие с негероической реальностью, где вместо общенационального братства царил расовая и социальная неприязнь, отчаянные схватки с врагами человечества заменялись бомбардировками мирного населения «недемократических» стран, а массовый героизм – массовым потреблением *joy pills*<sup>3</sup>.

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2 Фронтир (*англ.* frontier – «граница», «рубеж») – граница освоения Дикого Запада американскими колонистами, постепенно перемещавшаяся по мере их продвижения к Тихоокеанскому побережью. Дух Фронттира – дух первопродства, риска, мужества.

3 *Joy pills* (*англ.*) – «таблетки радости», разнообразные препараты для преодоления беспокойства, страхов, депрессивных состояний.



Тем не менее, разработанные в последней четверти XX века «с подачи» Элтона Винера технологии мифологического смыслообразования стали неотъемлемым элементом «мягкой силы». Сегодня они продолжают совершенствоваться и активно используются в проектах «умной силы» (smart power), что, действительно, облегчает «социальный контроль в постиндустриальном обществе», однако совсем не похоже на величественный и универсальный целеполагающий миф, о котором писал американский профессор. Что касается других стран и цивилизаций, то их мифологизированные национальные «мечты» также не несут в себе мессианского пафоса и не претендуют на роль общечеловеческого идеала. Проекты возвышения национального духа по-прежнему разрабатываются для отдельных частей враждующего, разделённого, расколотого человечества. А между тем его «цветущая сложность» продолжает существовать как единая взаимосвязанная система и только как единое целое закончит или продолжит своё существование. Последний вариант предполагает выработку столь же единой системы базовых бытийных смыслов относительно природы человека, места во Вселенной, предназначения на Земле, высших нравственных императивов и табу.

Принято считать, что после Винера тема мифологического смыслообразования как способа канализирования позитивной духовной энергии человечества с целью решения общепланетарных задач не разрабатывалась никем. Однако это не так. В то время, когда международное сообщество обществоведов обсуждало проблему целенаправленного конструирования нового Величественного Мифа, молодой, почти никому не известный русский автор по имени Милана Алдарова уже не первый год предпринимал беспрецедентную попытку проникновения в мироощущение и миропонимание творцов древних мифов, чтобы «их глазами» посмотреть на современный мир. Результатом

этой многолетней титанической работы стал основанный на огромном количестве научных источников, не имеющих аналогов труд – поэтический, философский, исторический, этнографический – под названием «Дедал. Оратория». Он был издан лишь в 2017 году, когда автора уже не было в живых<sup>4</sup>.

Книга Алдаровой представляет собой подробнейшую поэтико-прозаическую энциклопедию античного мира, научно выверенный, наиболее капитальный на данный момент «путеводитель» по его истории и культуре. В центре повествования – первая в истории мировой литературы художественная реконструкция мифа о Дедале, изобретателе, архитекторе, скульпторе, воздухоплавателе, создавшем, по преданию, и знаменитый критский лабиринт, и крылья, способные вознести человека в небо. Автору удалось заново освоить пространство и полифонию мифа, проникнуть в тайны мифологического смыслообразования при помощи культурного и научного багажа, накопленного человечеством к исходу XX столетия. «Вечности дар мой», – читаем мы на титульном листе книги вольный перевод известной сентенции Фукидида. И в этом нет преувеличения.

Имя Миланы Алексеевны Алдаровой (1956–2012), к сожалению, продолжает оставаться почти неизвестными и сегодня, после выхода в свет её эпохального труда. Равно как и биография автора. С отличием окончила механико-математический факультет МГУ. Была человеком необычайно глубоким, всесторонне образованным, одарённым. Писала стихи. Дружила с Анастасией Ивановной Цветаевой, академиком РАН В.А. Легасовым, а после публикации в 1988 году поэтического сборника «Отсрочьте суд!» – заочно, по переписке – с Зинаидой Алексеевной Шаховской<sup>5</sup>. Главный литературный арбитр русского за-

4 Милана Алдарова. Дедал. Оратория. – М.: Искусство-XXI век, 2017. 408 с., ил.

5 Переписка с З.А. Шаховской представлена в одном из приложений к книге. См. Милана Алдарова. Дедал. Оратория. С. 388-401.

рубежья отметила стихи Алдаровой как единственный образец подлинной поэзии на хорошо знакомом ей советском Парнасе (возможно, именно поэтому имя автора кануло в небытие). «Слыла красавицей, жила затворницей» (как сказал о ней другой академик РАН, В.П. Алексеев), посвятив жизнь работе над «Дедалом», так и не дождавшись выхода в свет своего детища. Но, к счастью, дождались мы – и теперь имеем возможность оценить его не только как высочайший взлёт человеческого духа и поэтического таланта, чудо эстетического постижения античного канона, позволяющего насладиться эффектом присутствия в пространстве мифа, но и как своеобразную модель мифологического смыслообразования в мире XXI века, Величайший Миф для современного человечества.

Если для Элтона Винаера мифотворчество – всего лишь средство эффективного социального управления, технология манипуляции массовым сознанием, то для Миланы Алдаровой миф – средство преобразования реальности через преобразование человека. Если для Винаера, говоря словами П.-Ж. Беранже, это «навевание золотого сна» смертельно больному человечеству, то для Алдаровой это трудный поиск «дороги к святой правде», пути к спасению. Правда выступает у неё и главным смыслом общечеловеческого бытия, и средством спасения мира от самоуничтожения, и высшим критерием всех человеческих деяний, и «нашим ответом» американскому учёному (книга которого осталась для Алдаровой неизвестной). «Чу! Зыбучие волны молвы / сквозь наплывы почивших веков / безутратно доносят Правду»<sup>6</sup>. Автор «Дедала» подчёркивает, что эта Правда – особая, «заданная мерой не наших дней и не наших широт, Правда Платона и его современников»<sup>7</sup>. Ради обретения этой меры, первоизданной ясности мировидения и было предпринято по-

6 Милана Алдарова. Дедал. Оратория, с. 15.

7 Милана Алдарова. Дедал. Оратория, с. 354.

гружение в «дни и широты» мифа о трагической судьбе мифического героя. Воскрешение древности совершается автором ради переосмысления сущности и бытийного предназначения человека, ибо выход мировой системы из точки бифуркации на спасительную траекторию предполагает поиск героя, способного воплотить в себе общечеловеческое призвание и потому достойного возведения на планетарный пьедестал.

Героем – и, следовательно, объектом мифологизации – у всех народов считается тот, кто совершил *подвиг* – прорыв за пределы своих естественных человеческих возможностей, кто сумел «переключить» волю и силу духа с временного на вечное – на некий высший нравственный императив. Этот базовый смысл пока что непререкаем. Предметом обсуждения время от времени становится лишь вопрос о человеческой способности к подвигу: что это – удел пассионарных элитариев или потенциальная способность любого простого смертного? Ответ Миланы Алдаровой соответствует авраамическому богословскому канону: богоданная свобода осознанного нравственного выбора есть одно из проявлений богоподобия каждого человека. *«Мужество молвит: всегда / можно спасти честь! / Выхода нет – пусть! / Но выбор свободный – есть!»*<sup>8</sup> Разумеется, общепризнанным героем становится тот, кто совершает подвиг не столько ради спасения собственной чести, сколько ради своего народа, страны, всего человечества. И на это, по мнению автора, тоже способен каждый. Более того, каждый призван к этому – предназначением свыше, собственной человеческой природой, временной ограниченностью своего земного бытия. *«Сраму не имеют мёртвые... / Но и славы не имеют! / Сумей, пока телом молод, / Успей, пока плещут силы, / Свершить свой – единственный в мире, / тебе лишь дарованный дивно, /*

8 Милана Алдарова. Отсрочьте суд! : Стихи. – М.: Советский писатель, 1988. 11 с. Концепция Миланы Алдаровой представлена не только в книге «Дедал. Оратория», но и в цитируемом здесь и далее сборнике её стихов.

тебя лишь достойный / – Подвиг!»<sup>9</sup> Это может быть подвиг борьбы за жизнь, одоления, казалось бы, неминуемой смерти. «Титан Прометей, сын титана Япета, рождённого Землёй и Небом, был обречён единоборству с бедой на гигантской пустынной скале... И выдюжил. Пилот Алексей, сын Мересьева Петра, рождённого Россией, был обречён единоборству с бедой среди чистого, белого снега... И выдюжил», – пишет Алдарова, привычно стирая границу между мифом и реальностью<sup>10</sup>.

Речь, однако, идёт не только о подвиге-порыве, подвиге-броске, но и – в первую очередь – о подвиге созидания, творчества, напряжённого жертвенного труда-миссии во имя будущего. Таким подвигом был для самой Алдаровой её «Дедал», над которым она на пределе сил неотрывно работала многие годы, возлагая надежды на просветительскую миссию «Оратории». «Я факел, люди! Я для вас горю!» – могла бы сказать она о себе словами героя одного из своих стихотворений<sup>11</sup>. Русское слово «подвиг» происходит от глагола «двигать». Отсюда же и церковные понятия «подвижник», «подвизаться». «Доблестный подвижник», «самоотверженец» – так раскрывает смысл понятия «герой» В.И. Даль в своём толковом словаре<sup>12</sup>. Другими словами, базовый смысл понятия героического – это жертва, приносимая ради того, чтобы «подвинуть», подтолкнуть мир в спасительном направлении. Её олицетворением и стал мифический подвижник-мастер, которого Алдарова полностью «реабилитировала» своею авторской волей<sup>13</sup>.

9 Милана Алдарова. Отсрочьте суд! : Стихи, с. 47.

10 Милана Алдарова. Отсрочьте суд! : Стихи, с. 45.

11 Милана Алдарова. Отсрочьте суд! : Стихи, с. 29–30.

12 Вл. Даль. Толковый словарь живого великорусского языка. В 4 тт. Т. 1. – М.: Русский язык, 1978. С. 349.

13 В соответствии с пушкинской аксиомой о «несовместности» гения и злодея, Алдарова трактует гибель Тала (племянника и ученика Дедала) как результат досадной оплошности, очищая образ великого мастера от традиционно приписывавшегося ему греха преднамеренного убийства. Другое дело, что смутное чувство, шевельнувшееся в душе Дедала в момент случайной гибели одарённого ученика, оказа-

Духовно-аксиологическая концепция Алдаровой адресована «всем, кому дорого сознание, что вскормившая его культура взрощена в лоне древнегреческой»<sup>14</sup>. Русской культуре, где дух Эллады дышит и в поэзии Пушкина, и в советских архитектурных проектах 1930-х годов, это должно быть дорого не меньше, чем западноевропейской. В своей культурной истории Россия ничего не заимствовала у Востока, а отдельные попытки русских философов «скинуться азиатством» (выражение К.Н. Леонтьева) рождали лишь мифы наподобие «евразийства» (Византия в своё время тоже была «Европой» – её квинт-эссенцией, авангардом). Автору «Оратории» дорого и сознание своей принадлежности к стране, первой в истории отправившей человека в космическое пространство. Именно этот факт объясняет, по мнению Алдаровой, то, что «честь / вознесть впервые / бряцанье хвалы исполниту Дедалу <...> выпала гражданину колосса-страны, / чья ракета первой из первых, / нацеливши курс в универсум, / весело крикнула Солнцу по-русски: Здравствуй!»<sup>15</sup>. «Дедал» – дитя не только глубоко постигнутой и освоенной автором античной культуры; в нём слышны отзвуки русского космизма, раздумий Алексея Лосева, Павла Флоренского, Сергея Аверинцева, Георгия Гачева. Именно мы, народ, первым устремившийся, «одолев испоконно причальные тросы планеты, / в чёрную беспредельность, / в даль без дна, пьянящую звёздами синими»<sup>16</sup>, – именно мы являемся прямыми наследниками эллинского духа дерзкого творческого порыва и самозабвенного труда во имя великой цели. «... Не терпим преград, не зрим препон, когда займётся полымя сверкающей Идеи! Удержу не знаем, когда зазвонит всеобуяющий Энтузиазм!» –

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лось достаточным, чтобы вызвать возмездие в виде столь же нелепой смерти Икара и искупления вины его отца пожизненными душевными муками.

14 Милана Алдарова. Дедал. Оратория, с. 9.

15 Милана Алдарова. Дедал. Оратория, с. 13.

16 Милана Алдарова. Дедал. Оратория, с. 12.

поёт хор на древнегреческой орхестре<sup>17</sup>. «Нам нет преград ни в море, ни на суше», – вторит ему другой хор. «Ничто не охладит кипения порыва! <...> Ничто не загасит пылающего факела стремлений!» – уверяют солисты-хоревты; «Ничто не остановит нас на пути к манящей мете!» – клянётся благородный хормейстер-корифей. Ибо «в своих дерзаниях всегда мы правы», – уточняет русская дворянка Любовь Орлова. «Мню я быть мастером, затоковав о трудной работе, / чтоб останавливать мрамора гиблый разбег и крушенье, / лить жеребцов из бронзы гудящей, с ноздрями, как розы, / и быков, у которых вздыхают острые рёбра. <...> Дай мне больше недуга этого, жизнь, – я не хочу утоленья, / жажды мне дай и уменья в искусной этой работе»<sup>18</sup>. Это уже не «Дедал» – это написанные в 1932 году гекзаметры советского поэта Павла Васильева, убеждённого, что главное для народа – сохранить «древнюю человечью любовь к соседней звезде»<sup>19</sup>. «Да, мы до неё достигнем!» – пророчески восклицал он, затравленный «лидерами мнений» и литературным начальством, но исповедовавший Величественный Миф о созидании как признаке истинного бытия и бессмертия гения-творца. И мы когда-нибудь очнёмся и припомним, как когда-то тоже, подобно мифическому аэронавту, преодолевшему притяжение земных благ Крита, устремлялись «по камням, по пескам, по водам, / под лучепадами – дальше! и выше! / – туда, чему сегодня нет имени»<sup>20</sup>. Впрочем, границы мифического и исторического в «Оратории» весьма условны. Соединённый с современностью в качественно новое музыкально-поэтическое целое, миф здесь воспринимается как история, реально пережитая

17 Милана Алдарова. Дедал. Оратория, с. 79.

18 Павел Васильев. Быть мастером // Павел Васильев. Стихотворения и поэмы. – Новосибирск: Западно-Сибирское книжное издательство, 1966. 49 с.

19 Павел Васильев. Переселенцы. [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: Russian-poetry.ru/Poem.php?PoemId=10097

20 Милана Алдарова. Дедал. Оратория, с. 10.

героями (и лично автором)<sup>21</sup>. Да и где доказательства, что Дедал не был реальным обитателем ойкумены? Ведь если верить Эвгемеру из Мессены, многие мифы возникли из культа вполне реальных героев.

В «Оратории» Миланы Алдаровой представлена универсальная смыслообразующая парадигма, основанная на древнегреческом культурном коде с его двуединым архетипом созидательного подвига и безусловного нравственного императива. Эта парадигма сотериологична, ибо предлагает человечеству путь спасения от самоуничтожения. Она эсхатологична, ибо позволяет отделять вечное от временного – в мире и самом человеке. Общечеловеческий духовный порыв в будущее, добровольная аскеза ради великих трудов по спасению жизни на Земле – таков Величественный Миф, вознесённый автором над всеми видами социального мифотворчества. Герой, восторжествовавший над собственным человеческим естеством и превратностями судьбы, самоотверженный труженик, упорно идущий к гуманной цели, – таков идеал «человека с крыльями», способного вырваться из лабиринта смертоносной цивилизации.

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21 Не случайно на театрализованной презентации «Дедала» в Московском музыкальном театре «Геликон-Опера» 26 апреля 2018 года вполне серьёзно говорилось о восстановлении автором *исторической справедливости* по отношению к главному герою.



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## Фестиваль национальных культур

### ДЕПАРТАМЕНТ НАЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ И МЕЖРЕГИОНАЛЬНЫХ СВЯЗЕЙ ГОРОДА МОСКВЫ

В столице вновь прошел фестиваль национальных культур на Поклонной горе. В рамках XVII Московского фестиваля редакция журнала «Этносоциум» совместно с Департаментом национальной политики и межрегиональных связей города Москвы приняла участие в шестом проведенном празднике «Народы Москвы».

Праздник «Народы Москвы» – это красочное представление, в рамках которого творческие коллективы многонациональной столицы представят гостям праздника мелодии, танцы, поэзию, песни, национальные костюмы и музыкальные инструменты.

«Народы Москвы» – уникальное мероприятие, целью которого является укрепление межнационального согласия, межконфессионального мира и профилактика экстремизма и национализма в столице.

Идее проведения праздника предшествовал мультимедийный проект «Народы Москвы», который существует на протяжении 6 лет в формате еженедельных встреч с представителями разных народов в прямом эфире студии сетевого вещания. За это время в гостях у «Вечерки» побывали представители более 130 национальностей, проживающих в Москве.

Представление пройдет на главной сцене в формате городского мюзикла, где у зрителей будет возможность стать непосредственными участниками постановки.

*Press release*

*Пресс-релиз*

## **Винченцо Трани избран президентом Итало-Российской Торговой Палаты**

В конгресс-центре Торгово-Промышленной Палаты Российской Федерации прошла открытая конференция Итало-Российской Торговой Палаты. В рамках заседания состоялось избрание нового президента ИРТП, которым стал ее вице-президент и президент холдинга Mikro Kapital Group Винченцо Трани. Также состоялось обсуждение перспектив и планов экономических отношений России и Италии, в рамках которого было объявлено о подписании соглашения между ИРТП и «ВЭБ Инновации» о развитии инновационных предприятий России и Италии.

В начале заседания состоялось избрание нового президента ИРТП сроком на три года. После объявления итогов голосования, президент выступил перед гостями с речью, в которой обозначил проблемы, стоящие перед палатой и планы по их решению. В частности, Винченцо Трани выразил свое несогласие с недавним заявлением Европарламента о том, что Россия более не является стратегическим партнером Европейского Союза и указал пути для их сближения.

«По последним оценкам Всемирного банка, в период 2018-2020 гг. рост экономики Российской Федерации должен составлять от 1,5 до 1,8%. В отличие от Европарламента, мы видим положительные перспективы во взаимодействии России и ЕС, и продолжаем развивать взаимовыгодное сотрудничество России и Италии, – отметил Винченцо Трани. – Основываясь на этом, мы

выделяем четыре приоритетных постулата для нашей будущей работы: открытость для всех стран СНГ, цифровизация, широкое проникновение финансовых услуг и совершенствование индивидуальных навыков предпринимателей».

На открытой конференции также выступили: президент Торгово-промышленной палаты РФ Сергей Катрынин, посол Итальянской Республики в России Паскуале Терраччано, заместитель министра иностранных дел РФ Александр Грушко, и.о. руководителя Департамента внешнеэкономических и международных связей города Москвы Евгений Дридзе, заместитель Губернатора Нижегородской области Игорь Носов, а также ряд представителей бизнеса России и Италии.

Во время обсуждения перспектив отношений двух стран, члены ИРТГП приняли решение активизировать конструктивный диалог между компаниями в Италии и России, а также Узбекистане, Таджикистане и Казахстане. В частности, палата планирует содействовать отечественным малым и средним IT-предприятиям в поиске партнеров и клиентов в Италии, способных предлагать стабильные, масштабируемые и практичные решения.

В ходе своего выступления, Винченцо Трани заявил о намерении Итало-Российской Торговой Палаты подписать соглашение с ООО «ВЭБ Инновации», предметом которого станет расширение и углубление партнерских отношений сторон на основе сотрудничества, установления организационных и информационных связей, стремления к объединению усилий в целях реализации совместных проектов и создания благоприятных условий для развития инновационных предприятий России и Италии. Подписание документа назначено на шестое июня и состоится на Петербургском международном экономическом форуме.

Заседание комитета завершилось подписанием соглаше-

ния о сотрудничестве между Итало-Российской торговой палатой и Корпорацией развития Нижегородской области об оказании содействия экономическому, торговому, техническому, правовому, научному и культурному сотрудничеству между Италией и Нижегородской областью.

После основной части прошла пресс-конференция для СМИ, на которой журналисты задали вопросы Винченцо Трани, Сергею Катырину и Розарио Алессандрелло про развитие итало-российского бизнеса, санкции и реформы в сфере культуры.

Партнеры Итало-Российской торговой палаты, компания «Златоуст», подарили Почетному Президенту ИРТП Розарио Алессандрелло и новому Президенту ИРТП Винченцо Трани именные золотые ручки.



## Abstracts

*Zemanek Ladislav*

### **The Rise of Eurasia: Shaping the New Eurasian Paradigm**

The study presents a brief comparative view on the main Eurasian integration projects – Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Eurasian Economic Union, Greater Eurasia and the Belt and Road Initiative, focusing on their normativity, principles and goals. On the basis of such a comparison, a new paradigm of the international order called the New Eurasian Paradigm (NEP) is formulated. The article introduces a specific Eurasian attitude towards cooperation and integration and shows that there are no fundamental ideological contradictions among the Eurasian integration projects chosen but, at the same time, their successful development requires political will, close cooperation, mutual recognition and understanding and also a change of thinking, an identity reinterpretation and acceptance of Eurasia-orientated perspective and partnership.

**Key words:** Eurasia, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Eurasian Economic Union, Greater Eurasia, Belt and Road Initiative, China, Russia, integration, New Eurasian Paradigm.

*Tangatarova Nigora*

### **Foreign policy of sovereign Uzbekistan: basic principles and changes after 2016th**

The foreign policy shift realized by Shavkat Mirziyoyev caused unprecedented attention around Uzbekistan among the international community. In his two years of presidency Mirziyoyev has been able to transform the relations with all the neighbors, make input in settlement of Afghanistan problem, and enhance cooperation with global powers: Russia, China, and the US. Actual topic of Uzbekistan's foreign policy has been around the new foreign policy concept. The current and the first ever concept paper in the sphere of foreign policy was adopted on 1 August, 2012 – and delivered two major points: the military neutrality and Central Asia as a priority region of Uzbekistan's foreign policy.

**Key words:** Uzbekistan, foreign policy, international community, strategy, military neutrality, Central Asia.

**Biryukov S. V.**

**Development issues of Siberia:  
does the “big region” have perspectives?**

The article discusses possible alternative development strategies that could form the basis of a fundamentally new regional policy of Russia. The author addresses this issue in the context of a mega-project on the creation of State Corporation for the Development of Siberia and the Far East claimed recently by the federal authorities. The author analyzes this project in terms of its ability to provide the progressive development of the regions of Siberia and the Far East, ensure flexible alignment of federal and regional interests.

**Key words:** Siberia, the Far East, regionalism, regional strategy, regional development, regional policy, State Corporation, technocracy, centralism.

**Murashko S.F.**

**Rudakova S. V.**

**Educational autonomy of students**

The authors of the article consider topical issues of students' preparation for classes, planning and organization of independent work of a student in the process of education and performance of research works made by students, preparing them for independent solution of professional tasks.

**Key words:** modern communicative and educational needs, autonomous activity of the student, educational autonomy, individualization of education, information, computer, remote, practice-oriented, scientific and methodical technologies.

**Galaganova S.G.**

**«Recalling future»: mythological sense-building for XXI century**

Mythological sensebuilding is appreciated here as a smart mind-building technology, aimed at world culture renewal, which is urgent for human survival. The image of Daedalus, the famous mythical engineer and aeronaut, is argued to be an ideal pattern of a daring and creative human being, while Ancient Greek culture is treated as a source of basic existential senses. The latter are comprehended as a possible foundation for a universal goal myth, vital for planetary future.

**Key words:** myth, mythology, goal myth, sensebuilding, mythological sensebuilding, culture, Alton Wiener, «Magnificent Myth», Milana Aldarova, «Daedalus. Oratorio».



## Аннотации

*Земанек Ладислав*

### **Подъем Евразии: формирование Новой евразийской парадигмы**

Статья сравнивает главные евразийские интеграционные проекты – Шанхайскую организацию сотрудничества, Евразийский экономический союз, Большую Евразию и Инициативу Пояса и пути, сосредотачиваясь на их нормативную сторону, принципы и цели. Основываясь на их сравнении, формулируется новая парадигма международного порядка – т.н. Новая евразийская парадигма (НЕП). В статье анализируется специфический евразийский подход к межгосударственному сотрудничеству и интеграции и, впоследствии, показывается, что не существует никаких основных несогласий среди рассматриваемых интеграционных проектов. Однако, их удачное развитие требует политической воли, узкого сотрудничества, взаимного уважения и понимания, так же как и изменения мышления, реинтерпретации идентичности и принятия евразийской перспективы и партнерства.

**Ключевые слова:** Евразия, Шанхайская организация сотрудничества, Евразийский экономический союз, Большая Евразия, Инициатива Пояса и пути, Китай, Россия, интеграция, Новая евразийская парадигма.

*Тангатарова Нигора*

### **Внешняя политика суверенного Узбекистана: основные принципы и изменения после 2016-го года**

Изменения во внешней политике, осуществленные Шавкатом Мирзиёевым, вызвали беспрецедентное внимание международного сообщества к Узбекистану. За два года своего президентства Мирзиёев смог трансформировать отношения со всеми соседями, внести свой вклад в урегулирование проблемы Афганистана и расширить сотрудничество с мировыми державами: Россией, Китаем и США. Актуальной темой внешней политики Узбекистана стала новая концепция внешней политики. Нынешний и первый в истории концептуальный документ в области внешней политики был принят 1 августа 2012 года - и в нем были отмечены два основных момента: военный нейтралитет и Центральная Азия как приоритетный регион внешней политики Узбекистана.

**Ключевые слова:** Узбекистан, внешняя политика, международное сообщество, стратегия, военный нейтралитет, Центральная Азия.

Бирюков С.В.

### **Проблемы развития Сибири: есть ли у «большого региона» перспективы?**

В статье рассматриваются возможные альтернативные стратегии развития, которые могли бы стать основой принципиально новой региональной политики России. Автор рассматривает этот вопрос в контексте мегапроекта о создании Государственной корпорации по развитию Сибири и Дальнего Востока, заявленного недавно федеральными властями. Автор анализирует данный проект с точки зрения его способности обеспечить поступательное развитие регионов Сибири и Дальнего Востока, обеспечить гибкое согласование федеральных и региональных интересов.

**Ключевые слова:** Сибирь, Дальний Восток, регионализм, региональная стратегия, региональное развитие, региональная политика, государственная корпорация, технократия, централизм.

Мурашко С.Ф.Рудакова С.В.

### **Образовательная автономность студентов**

Авторами статьи рассматриваются актуальные вопросы подготовки студентов к занятиям, планирования и организации самостоятельной работы студента в процессе обучения и выполнения студентами научно-исследовательских и учебно-исследовательских работ, готовящих их к самостоятельному решению профессиональных задач.

**Ключевые слова:** современные коммуникативные и образовательные потребности, автономная деятельность студента, образовательная автономия, индивидуализация обучения, информационные, компьютерные, дистанционные, практико-ориентированные, научно-методические технологии.

Галаганова С.Г.

### **«Воспоминание о будущем»: мифологическое смыслообразование для XXI века**

В статье рассматривается феномен мифологического смыслообразования как способ концентрации созидательной энергии человечества для преодоления кризиса современной цивилизации. Автор исследует образ мифического мастера и аэронавта Дедала, реконструированный поэтом и философом Миланой Алдаровой, в качестве идеала человека-творца, а культуру античности – в качестве источника базовых бытийных смыслов, способных послужить основой нового универсального целеполагающего мифа.

**Ключевые слова:** миф, мифология, целевой миф, смыслообразование, мифологическое смыслообразование, культура, Элтон Винер, «Величественный Миф», Милана Алдарова, «Дедал. Оратория».

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